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Symposium _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Professor Louis Henkin: The First
Thomas Jefferson Lecturer

New Gift to Benefit Legal
Writing Program
The Raynes, McCarty, Binder, Ross
and Mundy Legal Writing Instructorship has been established by that
Philadelphia law firm to be used annually to support the Law School's
legal writing fund. It is fashioned after
the Arthur Littleton Fund, which was
founded by the lawyers of Morgan,
Lewis and Bockius to honor their late
partner, Arthur Littleton, '20.
Arthur G. Raynes, in announcing the
Raynes, McCarty, Ross and Mundy
Legal Writing Instructorship said "our
firm is pleased to be associated with
this Program, and we would be doubly
pleased if our gift serves to enlist other
firms to follow our example."
Thomas J. Eicher, '83, is the first
Raynes, McCarty, Binder, Ross and
Mundy Legal Writing Instructor.

Former University of Pennsylvania
Law School Professor Louis Henkin
returned during the week of February
21-25 as the Law School's first
Thomas Jefferson Lecturer.
Professor Henkin, a foremost expert
on the laws related to foreign relations
and to the U.S. Constitution and presently a Professor at Columbia University Law School, delivered a senes of
lectures on human rights entitled " The
Age of Rights" during his weeklong
visit. Individual lectures in that senes
addressed the topics: ''The Idea of
Rights" and "The Law of Rights" .
Mr. Henkin also attended Law School
classes and conducted a seminar in
addition to meeting informally with the
students.
The Thomas Jefferson LeCtures
were initiated to attract leaders in the
field of law to spend an extended
period of time in residence at the
.
School. The Lecture Series is funded 1n
part by a grant from the Philadelphia
firm of Spector, Cohen, Gadon &
Rosen.

The I. Grant Irey Memorial Fund
To honor the memory of I. Grant lrey,
Jr. '60 the Law School has created a
F~nd .,'the income of which will permit the
expansion of curricular offerings in the
field of Business Law including , particularly, offerings related to financial institutions, by providing funds to attract
lecturers who have had substantial experiences in the practice." The Fund
shall also be used to support research
and writing in the area of Business
Law.
During his illustrious legal career, .
Grant lrey, a partner in the Philadelphia
firm of Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz,
was a distinguished counselor to corporations and banks. The I. Grant lrey
Memorial Fund will best reflect Mr.
lrey's interest in the law, and his affection for and pride in the Un1vers1ty of
Pennsylvania Law School.

WATCH FOR YOUR INVITATION
TO THE PENN LAW ALUMNI RECEPTION TO BE HELD DURING
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION MEETINGS IN ATLANTA,
GEORGIA-JULY 28-AUGUST 4,
1983

Transitions and New Faces

Geraldine Higgs, the Law School 's
new Admissions Officer replaces
Frances Spurgeon, Assistant Dean for
Admissions. Ms. Higgs, a twenty-year
employee of the University of Penn:
sylvania, has worked in the Adm1ss1ons
Office of the Graduate School of Education and has been Assistant to the
Chairman of the History Department
since 1975.

Gloria Watts, former Assistant to
Vice-Dean Margo P. Marshall , is the
Law School's new Assistant Registrar,
replacing Registrar Gary Clinton.
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Symposium---------------------The Annual Judges' Reception
The Board of Managers of the University of Pennsylvania Law Alumni
Society presented its eighth annual Reception on November 30, 1983 for University of Pennsylvania Law School
students and Philadelphia Court of
Common Pleas Judges and their law
clerks at City Hall.
The event, organized and hosted annually by Judge Doris May Harris, '49,
offers Penn Law students the opportunity to meet informally with members
of the Philadelphia Trial Bench and to
become acquainted with the clerkship
program available after graduation .

Exhibit Featuring Women Displayed
in Great Hall

Bernard Barish, lt3, President of the Law Alumni
Society greets guests at Annual Judges' Reception
Judge Doris May Harris stands at the left.

Students attending Judges' Reception converse with Judge Kendall H. Shoyer, '29,
left center, and Judge George]. Ivins, right.

The Dean Becomes a Phi Delta Phi
Dean Robert H. Mundheim was initiated into the Penn Chapter of Phi
Delta Phi Legal Fraternity in February,
1983. Serving as Chancellor of the
Bench was Associate Professor and
Associate Dean Stephen B. Burbank.
The Gibson-Alexander Inn of Phi Delta
Phi was reactivated in 1981 after a 47
year absence from the Law School.
Last year's Honorary Initiates included
Professors Covey T. Oliver and Clyde
W. Summers, and Dr. Sadie T. M.
Alexander, '27.

.16112ipf..;{-i 1PfiC

.-'ot,

!J

q·"

Quinquennial Reunion WeekendOctober 15-16, 1983
Alumni from the Classes of 1978,
1973, 1968, 1963, 1958, 1953, 1948,
1943, 1938 and 1933 will be celebrating milestone reunions in October during the Law School's annual Quinquennial Reunion Weekend.
Beginning on Saturday morning, October 15, all of the reunion classes will
gather for a light breakfast to be followed by a program featuring Law
School Faculty and Alumni . A luncheon at the University's Faculty Club
will be held after the morning activities.
In the evening, each class will convene separately and celebrate at area
restaurants and hotels of their choices.
To complete the weekend's festivities,
Sunday brunch will be offered at Eden,
a restaurant on campus .
The officers of each Quinquennial
Class already have been contacted by
the Law School's Alumni office and
reunion plans are in progress. Watch
the mails for specifics!

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/plj/vol18/iss1/1

"100 Years of University of Pennsylvania Law School Women': an extraordinary exhibit researched and
prepared by Biddle Law Library
Reference Librarian, Nancy Arnold, is
on view in The Great Hall of the Law
School. Of special note are the portrait/posters of Alumnae Carrie
Burnham Kilgore, 1883, and Margaret
Center Klingelsmith, '1898, which
appear in the showcases at the
School's entrance.

The Women's Law Group
Conference-Changing Labor Laws:
Lawyers Working With Working
Women
The Women's Law Group at the University of Pennsylvania sponsored a
day-long conference on Saturday
March 5, 1983 on the impact of labor
and employment laws on working
women. The recent influx of women
into the labor force has raised many
new issues relevant to both women
and men. These issues have generated legal controversies and some of
these issues, such as sexual harassment that were once outside the scope
of the legal process, are now being
recognized as legal problems with
legal solutions.
The Conference explored the many
developments in labor and employment statutes, regulations, and judicial
decisions with the purpose to understand the implications for working
women and their attorneys. Participants were drawn from a variety of
backgrounds and perspectives including practicing lawyers, law school professors, law students, management
and union representatives, and
government officials.
Carol Bellamy, President of the New
York City Council, presented the opening address on Saturday morning. For
the rest of the day, nine workshops
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were available to participants: Organizing Working Women, Comparable
Worth, Women's Health and Safety in
the Workplace, Women's Issues in Collective Bargaining, Sexual Politics,
What is an "Equal Opportunity Employer"?, Labor and Employment
Legislation, Litigation Strategies for
Labor and Employment Lawyers, and
Employment Policies and Law: An
International Perspective. The panelists, representing the academic community, government agencies, corporations, and labor unions, made brief
presentations on the specified topic
based on his/her experiences and research, and then opened the forum for
discussion to the audience.
Among the contributors to the Conference were University of Pennsylvania Law Professors Drucilla
Cornell, Virginia Kerr '76, Edward
Sparer and Clyde Summers; and U niversity of Pennsylvania Law Alumni
Peggy Browning, '82, Wendella P. Fox,
'76, William Whiteside, '54, Stephanie
Middleton, '81, Julie Shapiro, '82 and
Paula Markowitz, '52. Also participating was Professor Fujio Hamada, who
is on a Fulbright Commission grant at
the University of Pennsylvania Law
School and is a professor of labor law
at Kobe University in Japan.
The Conference was sponsored
by the University of Pennsylvania
Women's Law Group, the National
Lawyers Guild, the United Auto
Workers, the Bell Telephone Company
of Pennsylvania and the America Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees.

The Second Annual Conference
on Public Interest Law
The Law School's annual Public Interest Law Conference entitled "New
Approaches to Law in the Public Interest'' was held on March 25-26,
1983. This year's conference featured
numerous important legal academics
and practitioners, as well as individuals
from other disciplines and experiences.
Its focus was geared toward developing a definition of "public interest law"
and an understanding of the conditions
necessary for the practice of law in the
public interest. Another important
aspect of the two-day conference was
to enable law students to interact with
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Janet Bayer, '84, left and Jenny McGill, '84 right.

practitioners in order to discuss, explore and appreciate the problems and
joys facing those involved in the practice of public interest law.
Father Robert F. Drinan, former
member of the U.S. House of Representatives and now Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law School,
delivered the keynote address. Law
School Faculty participants included
Professors Regina Austin, C. Edwin
Baker, Paul Bender, Drucilla Cornell,
Robert Gorman, Courtney Howland,
Seth Kreimer, Stephen Schulhofer,
Ralph Smith , Edward V. Sparer, and
Clyde Summers.
Other eminent participants were
Dean Derrick Bell, of the Oregon Law
School ; Professor Howard Lesnick, of
the CUNY Law School at Queen's College; Professor Sylvia Law of the New
York University Law School; Professor
Barbara Underwood of the Yale Law
School; Professor Rand Rosenblatt of
the Rutgers-Camden Law School; and
Professor Karl Klare of the Northeastern University Law School. Alumni
taking part in the various panel discussions were: David Kairys, '71, David
Ferleger, '72, Eleanor Myers, '75, John
Parvensky, '79, Howard Gittis, '58,
Benjamin Lerner, '65, Howard L.
Shecter, '68, and Holly Maguigan, '72.
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Community organizations were
represented at the Conference by
Richard Weishaupt, an attorney with
Community Legal Services; Louise
Brookins, President of the Welfare
Rights Organization; Karen Burstein,
Executive Director of the Consumer
Protection Board of Pennsylvania;
Margaret Fung of the Asian-American
Legal Defense and Education Fund;
John Pettit, Director of Tri-County
Neighbors Association, Inc.; Juan
Sanchez, organizer of Hispanic Farmworkers in Eastern Pennsylvania; Jack
Zucker of the Gray Panthers; Dan Burt,
President of the Capital Legal Foundation; Jerry Balter, Director of the Public
Interest Law Center of Philadelphia;
Antonia Hernandez, Associate Counsel
of the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund; Lowell Johnson of the
NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund; Sara Rosenbaum, Senior Health
Specialist, Children's Defense Fund;
Jody Smith, Executive Director, National Legal Aid and Defender Association; Elizabeth Schneider, who is with
the Constitutional Law Clinic at
Rutgers-Newark Law School; and
Sherman Kreiner, attorney and Executive Director of the Philadelphia
Association for Cooperative Enterprises. Additional contributors to the
conference who are practitioners from
the Philadelphia area engaged in
public interest law were: Robert
Sugarman, David Rudovsky, Judy
Chomsky, Thomas McGill, Pat Pierce
and Greg Sleet. Sylvia Brown, a
member of the University of Pennsylvania Law School Class of 1984,
moderated at one of the workshops.
The subjects of the Conference's
debates and panel discussions included "Social Purpose of the Law",
"Legal Education and the Public Interest: Law and Society", and "Public Interest Law: Race, Class and Sex''. The
workshops under the broad heading of
"New Approaches to Public Interest
Law" included: Solo and Small Firm
Practice, Alternative Delivery Mechanisms, Private Bar Pro Bono Work, A
New Look at Traditional Public Interest
Law Practice, Criminal Justice Practice
and How Do Community Organizations
Look at Lawyers?
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Symposium
Judge Phyllis W. Beck Addressed
Woman's Law Group

who opt for such a lifestyle might want
to try the route of the part time
employee in a law firm ; few firms,
however, have exhibited the willingness to be fle xible in such situations. In addition, parttime employees,
once accepted into a firm, are less
likely to rise in a firm 's power structure.
Following her provocative and
stimulating presentation, Judge Beck
entertained comments and questions
from the group.

Cyrus Vance to be
1984 Roberts Lecturer

Judge Phyllis Beck, former ViceDean of the University of Pennsylvania
Law School for the years 1976- 1981
and , presently, the fi rst woman to sit on
the Pennsylvania Superior Court
bench , spoke with members of the
Women 's Law Group on February 4,
1983. In her message, the Judge
traced her life experiences prior to attending law school (as a writer and ,
later, the mother of four children) ; her
subsequent careers as a practicing
lawyer (working both part- and fulltime), as a law professor (the head of
the Temple University Law School 's
Clinical Program for two years) , and as
a Law School Administrator (the ViceDean of the University of Pennsylvania
Law School for five years); and, finally,
her " journey to the Pennsylvania
Superior Court bench ", for which she
is seeking reelection in the May 17th
primary contest.
Judge Beck described how she was
able to successfully manage both a
career and a family-an issue of great
moment to many of the women law
students assembled and, in the
Judge's opinion, " a problem that has
not been addressed sufficiently by
women and the women 's movement" .
The Judge suggested that today's
career-m inded women must decide
" whether or not they wish to marry
and/or whether or not they want to
bear children ", then be ready to accept the attendant responsibilities built
into the task of child-rearing . Women
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The 1984 Owen J. Roberts Memorial
Lecture will be delivered on February
23 , 1984 by Cyrus R. Vance, former
U.S. Secretary of State. The Winter
1983 Law Alumni Journal erroneously
announced Mr. Vance as the 1984
Thomas Jefferson Lecturer.

Chief Justice Roberts is Third
Alumni Luncheon Forum Lecturer
Chief Justice Samuel J. Roberts,
'31, of the Pennsylvania State
Supreme Court, will deliver the third
lecture in this year 's Philadelphia
Region Alumni Luncheon Series at
12:00, Wednesday, April 27, 1983 at
the PNB Concourse, Broad and
Chestnut Streets. Chief Justice Roberts '
speech is titled '' Reflections' '.
Irving S. Shapiro , the Chair of the
Law School's Board of Overseers and
the first of this year's lecturers, spoke
on " The Mid-East Peace Proposal : A
Personal View " in November 1982.
The second lecture was delivered in
February, 1983 by Penn Law Professor Clyde W. Summers, whose address, " Municipal Employees and
Strikes", appears in this issue of the
Journal.

The Dean's Calendar
Dean Robert H. Mundheim looks forward to meeting and becoming betteracquainted with Alumni at the following scheduled Alumni events, Law Alumni
Society functions and Bar Association and. professional meetings:
January 7, 1983 .... Alumni Breakfast at Meetings of American Association
of Law Schools, Cincinnati
. . Law Alumni Society Alumni Second Luncheon Forum,
February 1
Philadelphia
March 1 . ..... .. .. . Northern New Jersey Alumni Dinner
March 3 . . .
. . Southern New Jersey Alumni Dinner
March 30 . . .. . . . . . . Los Angeles , California Alumni Luncheon
April 9 . . .. . . .. . .. . Black Law Students Union Alumni Program and Dinner
April 11 .. . . . . ... . . Allentown , Bethlehem , Easton Alumni Reception
April 12 . . .. .... . . . World Affairs Council Circle-Law School
April 19 ... .. .. .... Law Alumni Day
April 22 ........... New York Alumni Luncheon at New York Bar Association Meetings
April 27 .. .. . .. .. .. Law Alumni Society's Third Alumni Luncheon Forum ,
Philadelphia
April 29 .. . ... . .... Law School Class of 1931 Dinner honoring Chief
Justice Samuel J. Roberts of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.
May 4 . . . . .. . . . . . . Law Alumni Reception at the Pennsylvania Bar
Association Meetings, Hershey, Pennsylvania
May 11 ...... .. . .. Akron-Cleveland
io
, Oh Law Alumni Luncheon
May 12 ........... Chicago Alumni Luncheon
May 13 .. ... .. . . .. New Jersey Alumni Reception at the New Jersey Bar
Association Meetings, Atlantic City
May 20 . .......... Washington , D.C. Alumni Luncheon during All
Meetings
May 23 ........... Law School Commencement
July 28- August 4
ABA Meetings-Atlanta, Georgia
October 15- 16 .... . Quinquennial Reunion Weekend

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/plj/vol18/iss1/1
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Where are These Lost Alumni?
We have no record of the whereabouts of the following Alumni. Would anyone with information on the law firms and/or
home addresses of these lost classmates (and/or other listed Alumni) please write to Lost Alumni, c/o The Alumni Office,
The University of Pennsylvania Law School, 3400 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104 or call (215) 898-6321?
'28 Maurice W. Kail
Douglas H. Kiesewetter
'64 Linda Ridi*
Richard M. Stone
John J. K. Smith
Martin Price
Gordon D. Simonds
Robert K. Vincent, Jr.
'29 Joseph R. Applebaum
'50 John J. Dailey
'65 Paul R. Bracciotti
'71 Richard E. Beeman
Norvin Nathan
Vincent A. Carbonar
Mirza A. M. Beg*
'30 Horacia Casasus
Gustavo A. Gelpi
Jules E. Bernard Ill
H. G. Lowenstein
'51 Robert I. Goldman
James H. Johns, Jr.
Karl W. Heckman
Charles Nelson Moffett
Harry A. Ruber
John
E.
Kolofolias
James
R. Magee
Andrew J. Schroder 2nd
J. Dallas Shepherd
Harihar A. Patel
Joel
W.
Messing
Raymond G. Simkins
'31 Nathan Agran
David P. Ross
Steven P. Rapoport
Maj.
John
Teselle
Alexander Katzin
Peter V. Savage
Joel P. Sternfeld
William F. Trapnell
Phillip A. Sheaff Jr.
Robert M. Washburn*
'66 Lung Fong Chen*
'52
Joseph
J.
Hennessy
Geoffrey
A. Wilson*
'32 Mr. William L. Carranza
P. V. Grimaldi
Edward Hartzell
Diedre Mummery Davies*
'53 Edwin C. Bradford
'72 Andrew J. Duell
Dorothea Burns Lamb
Peter B. Dublin
R. R. Johnson, Jr.
Elizabeth M. Freedman
·Bernard S. Magen
Philip Shuchman
Morton J. Goldfein
Stephen J. Mills
John P. Howland
John M. Myers
'33 Sidney H. Kanig
'56 Shirley S. Bitterman
Robert M. Rosenblum
Dr. Ayala Procaccia*
Milton Kunken
Dr. Simeon N. Ferrer*
Albert
F.
Watters,
Jr.
Dr. Uriel Procaccia*
Cpl. Benjamin J. Lipetz
Hubert G. Francois*
Richard
W. Sherman
Anthony J. Sweeney Jr.
'67 James N. Albert
Robert J. Williams
Richard A. Siegal
Jeffrey L. Dow
'34 John E. Boland
Peter J. Tobiason
'57 Stylianos Nestor*
Franklin D. Grabill
Aaron Eisenstein
Fisseha
F. Yimer
Juan C. Puig*
Frederick G. Hilmer*
'35 Samuel H. Kaplan
Takashi Maeda*
'73 Michael J. Kalison
'58 Irwin Albert
Margaret D. McGaughey
Shibru Seifu
Arthur
M.
Dolin
'36 Joseph Kaufman
Marvin M. Witofsky
Dr.
Muhammad
H.
Elfarra*
'74 Leslie G. Dias
M. Philips Nathanson
Baron E. Kessler
'68 Michael P. Friedman
John M. Smith Jr.
Martin J. Genauer
James A. Loughran
Hugh P. Glukenhous
Hollis T. Hurd
Leonard R. Titelman
Lt. Col. James A. Mounts, Jr.
Norman L. Goldberg
'75 Lodewijk A. Briet, Jr.*
'37 Gene A. Bortz
Mr. Howard I. Oken
Alan R. Goodman
Willie L. Dawkins
Mr. Charles J. Donohue
Y. Evan Synnestvedt
Romer Holleran
James
A. Young Ill
Walter L. Oskierko
Howard H. Ward
David N. Kunkel
Harry K. Wampole
Jonathan S. Paulson
'76 Cheryl A. Crandall
'59 Jose D. Concepcion*
Harold
J.
Pokel
Charles M. Deese
'38 Harvey L. Panetta
Margaret Adam Halaby
J. H. Vanmerkensteijn Ill
Edward J. Vairo
Charles
H.
Harris
'39 Ruth Bonnelly McMahon
Carl
V.
Kapp
'69 Lesley Frost Behrendt*
'77 John Y. C. Beckwith
Harry Richman
Albert W. Laisy
Herbert Beigel
Richard Boydston
'40 Thos M. H. Broomall
Joseph R. McFate 2nd
Henry R. Cooper*
Nemecio E. Lopez, Jr.
Maurice H. Kirshner
John B. Galus
'60 H. Chester Grant
'78 Robin F. Hollington*
Henry Larzelere
Richard George
C.
Zachary
Seltzer*
Michael C. Kwang*
Albert E. Turner Jr.
John F. Hayes*
Charles M. Stonehill
Albert
D. Woodward
James C. Lahore*
'41 Leon W. Gore
Michael F. Walsh
Frank L. Langhammer
'79 Saul Mandel
Darthea Speyer
'61 Neal J. Auspitz
Ellen E. Mosen
John H. Palmer, Jr.
'42 Norva T. Cummings
Alice Graham Rhodes
'62
Michael
Barkow
'80 Kyung J. Park*
Mr. Dennis J. Lane
Peter K. Speert
Robert L. Miller
'63 Jonathan B. Baker
Krishna M. Vempaty*
'81 Linda R. Fannin
Michael M. Becker
Douglas M. Yorke*
Edwin Montes
'43 James G. Moore
Edward A. Comerton*
Jose
R. Paz Padilla*
'70 William A. Bachmann
'48 Robert F. Conrad
Cesar L. Coronado*
• Denotes LL.M. graduate
James A. Burke
Charles B. Selak Jr.
Mahmood A. Faruqui*
Kenneth L. Fredrickson
Guido Fienga*
'49 Alex L. Fricke
Samuel
M. Glasser
John M. Flackett*
Irvin J. Good
Harry
C.
Jackson
Michael A. Grean
Hugh H. Howard
Walter M. Lowney*
Robert
C.
Littman
Warren M. Jones
Susan G. Marion
Bernard Raoul Yochim
Morton Kaplan
Christopher Norall
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Featured Events _____________________
Professor Mishkin is 1982 Roberts Lecturer

Professor and Mrs. Mishkin, center, with Alumni including the Honorable
Norma L. Shapiro, '51.

Paul J . Mishkin, Emanuel S. Heller
Professor of Law at the University of
California School of Law, Berkeley,
and former Professor of Law at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School,
delivered the Owen J. Roberts
Memorial Lecture on October 21,
1982. Mr. Mishkin's Lecture, The Uses
of Ambivalence: Reflections on the
Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, will appear in
its entirety in The University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Volume 131 No.
4 April1983.
Professor Mishkin joins the cadre of
illustrious former Roberts Lecturers
which include distinguished Judges
Felix Frankfurter, Henry J. Friendly,
William H. Hastie and Arthur Goldberg;
eminent scholars Arthur L. Goodheart,
Herbert Wechsler, Covey Oliver, Erwin
Griswald, Paul Freund; renowned
diplomats Paul Henri Spaak and Abba
Eban; and esteemed practitioners Anthony Lester, Q.C. and Sidney Kentridge, S.C.
The Owen J . Roberts Memorial Lecture Series is sponsored by the Pennsylvania Chapter of The Order of The
Coif, the University of Pennsylvania
Law Alumni Society and The Law
School. Support for the series is provided by an endowment given by the
Philadelphia firm of Montgomery,
McCracken, Walker and Rhoads, in
memory of their founding partner, U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Owen J.
Roberts.

Professor Mishkin, center, with Bernard Barish, ~3, left,
President of the Law Alumni Society, and Dean Robert H.
Mundheim.
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The 1982 Edwin R. Keedy Moot Court Competition

The Keedy Bench: the Honorable Dolores K. Slaviter, '56, left, the Honorable John J. Gibbons,
center, and the Honorable Murray M. Schwartz, '55, right.

Moot Court Win ners, Thomas A. Isaacson, '83, and Andrew
D. Schau, '83.

Finalists Julie R. Fenster, '83, left, and Marc E. Alterman, '83, right.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

The final argument of the Edwin R.
Keedy Cup Competition was held on
November 12 at the University of
Pennsylvania Museum.
The distinguished 1982 bench included Judge John J. Gibbons, United
States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, presiding; Judge Dolores K.
Sloviter, '56, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; and Judge
Murray M. Schwartz, '55 United States
District Court for the District of Delaware. Former Supreme Court Justice
Potter Stewart, originally scheduled as
one of the 1982 judges, canceled his
commitment due to illness.
The 1982 case for argument, Lucius
Claiborne v. State of Montabama, involved a conviction under a state
statute which required a mandatory
ten-year prison sentence and a fine of
$25,000 for persons trafficking large
quantities of drugs. The state attorney,
however, could move the sentencing
court to reduce or to suspend the
sentence if the person convicted provided substantial assistance in the
identification, arrest or conviction of
any of his accomplices, accessories,
co-conspirators or principals. The
defendant in the case contended that
to escape the statute's mandatory
penalties, he was forced to give up his
privilege against self-incrimination .
The Keedy finalists, all members of
the Class of 1983, were Marc E.
Alterman , Julie R. Fenster, Thomas A.
Isaacson and Andrew D. Schau . The
arguments presented by both sides
were acclaimed " of high quality" by
the judges, but the team of Isaacson
and Schau, who argued for the appellee, emerged the victors.
Professor Ralph S. Spritzer, the Moot
Court Faculty Advisor, developed the
case which was based on a Florida
statute that had been reviewed by the
U.S. Supreme Court.
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Our Man For All Seasons
by Libby S. Harwitz
Louis B. Schwartz, '35, joined the
Faculty of this Law School in 1946. In
June, he will retire from his teaching
responsibilities at the University of
Pennsylvania after thirty-seven years,
and will continue his work at Hastings
College of the Law in San Francisco,
California.
Mr. Schwartz is a legend-a University of Pennsylvania Law School institution. Since most of the School's living
Alumni have experienced him as their
professor of crimina/law and/or
economic regulation and/or professional responsibility, his skills as a
distinguished, vital and demanding
educator are already well-known.
Over the years, many Penn Law
Alumni have benefitted from Mr.
Schwartz 's personal interest. As friend
and mentor, he adopts an almost
parent-like pride when touting an
Alumnus ' recently published novel or
fascinating career change or newlyacquired editorship or elevation to a
high position in government or in
business.
Lou Schwartz is the quintessential
Renaissance man-musician, breadbaker, gadfly/philosopher, book reviewer, gardener, author, photographer, and legal scholar/specialist in
two areas-crimina/law and economic
regulation.
My tenure as JOURNAL editor
began in 1975 and, from that time to
the present, Mr. Schwartz has been the
publications's chief ''idea-person''.
Lou 's frequent and welcome memos
offering suggestions that THE
JOURNAL explore " what members
of the Penn Law Faculty do during
summer vacation ", or that it consider
articles on the "following Alumni"
whose careers and lives might make
fascinating copy, were always worthy
of investigation and implementation.
The flow of Lou 's fresh and unique
ideas was endless, and his departure
will result in the lose of one of
THE JOURNALS major creative
sourses.
Last autumn, Professor Schwartz
was guest speaker at the 25th Anniversary Reception and Dinner celebration
of the New York City Alumni Regional
8
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Club. At that event, in inimitable
Schwartz-style, he delivered an assessment of his career-including the
failures as well as the triumphs. Presented here is that appraisal "of-theman-by-the-man" on the occasion of
his retirement as Benjamin Franklin
and University Professor of Law, The
University of Pennsylvania.

10

et al.: Law Alumni Journal

The Reek of Success:
Notes of Caution on the Occasion of Eulogies
by Professor Louis B. Schwartz
Standing on this platform with Dean
Robert Mundheim 's encomia ringing
pleasantly in my ears, I cannot suppress a perverse impulse to balance
the picture with a report on the failures
in my life. It is part of the duty of a professor, is it not, to expound the truth,
the whole truth , and the chiaroscuro of
light and shade that characterizes real
as opposed to idealized biography.

No one could stand here without
sniffing the reek of success that pervades this 25th anniversary occasion.
You are successes-partners and
associates in powerful law firms and in
great enterprises. As you have heard
from Dean Mundheim, the Law School
is a great success, with ever-increasing
multitudes of applicants requesting admission. The Dean himself reeks of
success. Leaving behind a splendid interlude at the highest levels of government, Bob Mundheim takes charge at
the Law School with confidence and
urbanity.
In the light of the attributes and good
wishes that many of you-classmates,
former students, colleagues- have
privately extended to me, I have no
alternative but to acknowledge that I
a/so must reek of success. Academe
has been very good to me. It has provided almost unfailing stimulation
(faculty meetings apart, Mr. Dean) ,
freedom and independence (from
clients, patrons, bosses), opportunities
for tax-deductible travel throughout the
world , the chance to stay young by
constant encounters with the young
and the bright, and the leisure time
and money to build a glorious retreat
down-East in Maine. Nor has it cut me
off altogether from the profitable practice of law.
When I count my successes, they go
beyond the public gratifications: my
publications, my work for the American
Law Institute as Reporter for the Model
Penal Code, my participation in the
National Commission to Study the Antitrust Laws, my directorship of the National Commission on Reform of the
Federal Criminal Laws. My " private"
successes, on which I set great store
and immodestly list before going to the
failures which are my original theme ,
include the following : In 1963, I persuaded the Faculty to establish the
Law School Honorary Fellow Program
whereby each year at commencement
we honor a lawyer who , at the risk of
his/her career, participated in courageous vindication of civil rights, justice
for the poor, and resistance to oppression. These Fellows, whose photographs and citations are on permanent
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display in the Law School Lobby, serve
as models to our students today.
I inaugurated the program of bridgebuilding between the Law School and
the fine arts, arranging for showings of
paintings and sculpture by students in
the University's Graduate School of
Fine Arts. This year, my suggestion to
organize an art show featuring members of the Law School Community
and their families came to successful
fruition. Many others, also, have followed these initiatives and, today, the
Law School is unique in its presentations of art and music.
I count among my private accomplishments the gracing of our professorial offices with lush and exotic
plantings, my cue having been taken
from Harvard Professor, Lon Fuller, a
colleague with whom I taught while at
that institution in 1964.
Now for my failures , which are impressive. The greatest, undoubtedly,
was the collapse of the movement for
reform of the federal criminal laws.
Directing the National Commission,
chaired by former Governor Pat Brown
of California, was a job for which much
of my early career in the United States
Department of Justice, at the American
Law Institute, and in the teaching of
criminal law had uniquely prepared
me; the need was urgent and the
political sponsorship favorable. The
high-water mark was reached in 1977
when Senator Ted Kennedy shepherded the reform bill through the
Senate by a vote of 74-15. It was all the
more agonizing to have the reform effort frustrated by those who were normally my political allies, particularly the
American Civil Liberties Union which
followed a policy of ali-or-nothing , and
opposed the reform because it did not
incorporate every advance that could
be envisioned.
Another disappointment that should
help dispel the " reek of success" was
my failure to get the essential fourth
vote for certiorari in the case of
Schwartz and Segal v. The Defender
Association of Philadelphia, PA. 353 ,
307 A.2d 906,414 U.S. 1079 (1973),
where I had sought to establish as a
constitutional principle the complete independence of public defenders from
domination by mayors and city councils affiliated with the police and the
district attorneys. This disappointment
was exacerbated by a sneaking feel-

ing, possibly experienced by all losing
counsel , that I was partly responsible
for the defeat. In this situation , my error
was in overarguing the case in the petition for certiorari so that a Justice who
was so inclined could prematurely
disagree with me on the merits, rather
than simply recognize that an important issue was presented.
A nagging sense of inadequacy
which , for the first time I now publicly
avow, relates to my Supreme Court
" victory" in Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S.
134 (1951) . Appointed to represent the
prisoner Palmer, who had been
railroaded into a forty-year sentence for
a petty burglary charge without benefit
of counsel , I prevailed with my preGideon argument that the record
showed substantial prejudice to
Palmer's due process rights in view of
the seriousness of the case , and to his
youth , inexperience, and limited intelligence. When Abe Fortas soon
thereafter got the Court to accept the
rule that trial of a serious criminal case
without counsel was ipso facto a denial
of due process, Gideon v. Wainright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963), I asked myself
whether my friends on the Supreme
Court had not meant to tender me the
great opportunity, which I had passed
up, in the view that my single client's
best interest lay in bringing him within
the established rule , however
unsatisfactorily.
What shall I say of the great
" liberalization" of the law of abortion
which I brought about in the Model
Penal Code of the American Law Institute? Imagine my chagrin when the
Supreme Court thereafter, in Rowe v.
Wade, 41 0 U.S. 113 (1973), held that
my rule was unconstitutionally restrictive of women's rights to choose at
least during the first trimester of
pregnancy. With much difficulty I persuaded the majority of the pundits of
the Institute to go as far as decriminalizing abortion where the pregnancy
resulted from rape or incest, or where
continuance of the pregnancy would
threaten the life or health of the mother,
or where the offspring would suffer
from serious physical handicaps. Think
how a liberal's pride suffers when his
reform is held unconscionable in a
decision backed by such conservative
stalwarts as Burger, Blackmun and
Powell!
My failures in academic reform were
the hardest to bear. Having stimulated
the creation at the Law School of a
" Committee on Teaching " to address
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the problem of widespread student
alienation and anti-intellectualism ; I
bumped my head against a number of
stone walls. Projects for an integrated
rational curriculum were defeated. As I
told my colleagues, perpetual curricular revisions here as at other schools
represent no coherent philosophy of
education, but only a negotiated multilateral treaty among professorial mandarins intent on defending their particular turfs. New subjects are added
but never at the cost of corresponding
contractions elsewhere in the curriculum . Consequently, the feeling was that
" electives" multiply and people
graduate with glaring omissions in their
training . Grading systems are installed
on the principle that nearly half the
students will be graded merely " pass"
The avowed purpose is to obscure the
notable failures of a small percentage
of the class. Nobody is fooled-neither
fellow-students, nor prospective
employers and, most notably, not the
bar examiners whose pitiless scorings
almost unerringly pick out our " bare
passes" and make the School look
bad as a training ground . The only effect of misplaced solicitude for a small
minority is to prejudice a substantial
portion of the class whom prospective
employers cannot discriminate from
"bare passes" . My proposed reform ,
to reestablish a "bare pass" category
such as exists at peer schools and
elsewhere in the University, went down
to defeat.
At the University level, there were
dreary episodes when seemingly uncontroversial proposals for improvement foundered on bureaucratic
inertia. That was the fate of my project
for upgrading the approaches to the
University by systematic policing to
stop slum-lord neglect and trash-littering. It was the fate, likewise, of my
earnestly advanced proposal to extend
the University's physical planning conception to make the neighboring
historic and beautiful Woodland
Cemetery a meaningful part of our
physical environment.
Such croppers! Such heartaches for
an " achiever" ! But I must go no further. Already, I see tears of sympathy
coursing down a cheek here and
there. Is that a strangled sob I hear? I
must not cause you further distress on
so happy an occasion . Be assured ,
however, that notwithstanding the
dolorous tales I have to tell, I really do
not find the reek of success
unbearable.
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Municipal Employees and Strikes
by Professor Clyde W. Summers

Editor's Note:
Clyde W. Summers, the Law School's
Jefferson B. Fordham Professor of Law,
received his undergraduate (B.S.) and

law (J.D.) degrees from the University of
Illinois, his graduate degrees from Col-

umbia University (S.J.D.) and from the
University of Stockholm (L.L.D.) as
well as from the University of Louven
(L.L.D.) in Belgium. He has been a Guggenheim Fellow, a Columbia University
and a Ford Faculty Fellow, and was
awarded grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the
German Marshall Fund for the year
1977-1978. Mr. Summers is a nationally-recognized scholar in the field of labor
law and has authored many works, in-

eluding law review articles, in that area.
Professor Summers came to the Law
School in 1975, having spent nineteen
years at Yale as the Garver Professor of
Law. In addition to labor law, he teaches
courses in income security, public
employee bargaining, individual rights,
and internal union affairs, along with
others from time to time.
In 1979, Mr. Summers was the recipient of the University of Pennsylvania's
Lindback Award for excellence in
teaching.
Professor Summers delivered the
following lecture, which was the second
of the Law Alumni Society's Philadelphia
Region Alumni Luncheon series, on
February 1, 1983.

I recognize that no person with moderate sense and minimum caution
would enter the cross-fire of debate
over the right of public employees to
strike. One would be lucky to escape
undamaged, much less make any
useful contribution. But so much of the
debate seems to me to skirt the central
issues, that I will run the risk with the incurable optimist and present a different
perspective and method of analysis of
the problem.
The arguments opposing and supporting the right of public employees to
strike run in matched pairs. On the one
side, there are those who oppose the
use of strikes by public employees
describing them as violations of the
state's sovereignty-a form of insurrection. On the other side, the matched
argument is of equal profundity , offering an equal lack of logic-that there is
a constitutional right to strike. These
arguments, of course, solve nothing, for
the problem is not of whether the prohibition of strikes is constitutional but
of whether they should be allowed.
In another matched pair of arguments, those who oppose public
employee strikes project a picture of
disaster when government closes its
doors and public services ceaseanarchy reigns. Those on the other
side point out that a strike on a commuter rail line is no different if it is
owned by SEPTA (The Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transit Authority) or if it is
owned by the Pennsylvania Railroad;
or, to use another example, that a
strike by public school teachers is no
different from a strike by parochial
school teachers or teachers at Girard
College.
The argument that strikes bring undue pressure on government and distort the political process is matched by
the argument that strikes must be
available to make collective bargaining
work. Finally, the argument that the law
should not attempt to prohibit strikes
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because such laws cannot be enforced is matched by the argument
that what we need is better laws and
the determination to enforce them .
Running throughout the entire
debate and through a part of each pair
of arguments-sometimes submerged
and sometimes on the surface-are
assumptions and assertions as to
whether public employment is similar
to private employment, whether the
law and practice in the public sector
should be the same as that in the
private sector. The important question,
however, is not one of comparison or
transplantability between the public
and private sectors but rather what
procedures are appropriate terms and
conditions of employment for public
employees, and whether the strike is a
proper part of those procedures. It is
this question which we should confront directly.
The starting point, I would suggest,
is a fundamental principle that is so evident that it ought not need articulation.
The central and simple truism is that
public employees are employees of the
public; the public is the employer. And
who is the public? The public consists
of the citizens and taxpayers who demand the services of their employees
who pay their wages. The public
employer is not the mayor, not the city
council , not even the city as an abstraction. The public employer is
the collectivity of citizens, users and
taxpayers.
Citizens, the taxpayers and users of
services-the members of the publicbehave much like all other employers.
What they want from their employees is
more production at lower costs. They
want more police protection, better
schools, smoother streets and prettier
parks-and they want lower taxes.
They want more service for less
money-both at the same time. Because payroll costs make up 60% to
70% of a normal city's operating costs,
there is always pressure to get more
work out of public employees and to
pay them lower salaries. That is where
the service/tax combination pinches
most. When public employees strike,
they strike against those who demand
the services and who pay the wages.
The second fundamental principle to
be recognized is that the determination
of terms and conditions of employment
for public employees is a political decision. Economic forces, including the
labor market, influence those who

make the decisions. The questions of
how many shall be hired, what tasks
they shall be assigned, and what they
shall be paid, are ultimately made
through the political process, particularly through the budgeting and
taxing process. That process is politically answerable to those who use the
services and pay the taxes.
The function of a strike by public
employees is to influence the outcome
of the political process. It is to induce
the employers-the taxpayers and the
users of public services-to be willing
to pay more to their employees than
they might otherwise pay. It makes the
costs of the union's demands more
politically acceptable by making refusal
of those demands more politically
unacceptable.
The instructive reaction to this perspective is to label a strike by employees a "political strike" and, by attaching such a label, to cease all further thought. This, however, is but the
beginning of inquiry. The question still
remains-if we are to be slaves to
semantics-Is it appropriate for
economic pressure to be used in the
making of this particular class of
political decisions?
I would remind you that economic
considerations and, indeed, economic
pressures enter into many political
decisions. Businesses often bargain
with city officials for tax concessions or
other benefits in return for the promise
to locate or remain situated in a city.
Zoning decisions are shaped, if not
dictated , by economic pressures as
are a wide range of taxing and budgeting decisions. Economic pressure is
no foreigner to the political process,
and few pressures are as forthright and
visible as the strike.
Also, no one questions that public
employees can individually withhold
their services if the terms of employment are not acceptable-the 13th
Amendment guarantees that right. Our
intuitive labelling of strikes by public
employees as political strikes is a
response to our fear of concerted action. But I would remind you that such
concerted action directed toward influencing decisions of private
employers was once considered an
intolerable interference with market
processes. Now the concerted action
of the strike is permitted as an exception to the legally required " normal"
market process of open competition.
With this lesson from history, we should
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hold open the question of whether concerted economic action is appropriate
for influencing decisions in public
employment. Our intuitive fear of concerted economic action influencing
political decisions may have healthy
roots. I believe that it does, but there
still may be room for an exception permitting public employees to withhold
their services in order to influence the
political decisions of their employer
as to their terms and conditions of
employment.
It is worth noting that public sector
strikes have a certain directness of
confrontation which, in schematic
terms, gives them a special rationality
and appropriateness not found in
private sector strikes. When public
employees strike, they confront their
employers-the taxpayers and usersdirectly with the declaration, "You will
not have our services until you meet
our demands. " The taxpayers and
users can respond, "We would rather
do without. '' Not only is the confrontation direct, but the costs of settlement
are direct. The decision is controlled by
those whose services are involved and
who ultimately pay for the settlement.
Contrast this with the private sector
strike. If steelworkers strike, the impact
puts autoworkers out of work, but the
autoworkers have no voice concerning
the continuation of the strike or the settlement. The settlement affects the
price of steel , and the purchase of a
car helps pay the price, but the consumer has no voice in either the strike
or its settlement. The decision is made
by the United Steelworkers and the
steel companies. If maritime workers
strike, it is the shippers goods which
do not get moved; but the shipper has
no voice in the dispute. If the union
and the shipping companies decide to
settle, the cost of increased wages is
borne by the shippers, those who buy
the product, and the government
which provides subsidies. None of
these has a voice in the decision . But
when teachers or garbage workers or
any other public employees strike, the
ones who bear the burden of the strike
and who pay for the settlement are the
users and taxpayers. They have the
ultimate voice throughout the political
process. There is schematically a direct
confrontation of economic interest and
participation by those affected in the
decision-making.
Public employee strikes do not
always provide the perfect confronta-
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tion for those who bear the burden of
the strike, pay the costs of settlement,
and control the outcome. When school
teachers strike, the primary burden is
on the parents and the children;
however, many of those who pay the
teachers' salaries are taxpayers who
may have no children in school. Even
so, the confrontation is much more
direct than in a strike of steelworkers,
longshoremen, truckdrivers or
carpenters.
The usefulness or propriety of public
employee strikes, however, cannot be
judged simply by the elegance with
which it matches opposing interests
and allows each side to weigh the
costs of continued conflict against the
costs of settlement. The crucial question is whether the decisions to terms
and conditions of employment should
be influenced by the pressure brought
on by a strike, or whether they should
be determined free from those pres. sures. As citizens, users and taxpayers,
we would of course like to be able to
decide free from such pressures. Like
all employers, we would like not to be
subject to economic pressure. We
might persuade ourselves to pay more
because it is painful not to pay more,
and we do not want to bear the pain.
The case of the argument against
public employee strikes is that public
employees have sufficient political influence to protect their interests without
the strike, and the strike then gives
them too much political power. The
assumptions behind this argument
need to be examined. When public
employees have no right to strike, the
decision as to their terms and conditions of employment gets made
through the normal political process.
In this process, however, public employees are a distinct minority, and
those arrayed against the public employees are those who want the services and do not want to pay the taxes.
Politically, public employees are always outnumbered. To be sure public
employee unions are often highly
effective political organizations, but the
fact remains that what the public employee gains must be paid for either in
reduced services or increased taxes.
The people who pay always have the
largest potential political voice. It is
commonplace that collective agreements negotiated by political officials
are rejected by voters, and tax increases to pay for wage increases trigger taxpayer revolts. In thousands of

school districts, collective agreements
August.) If the parks employees strike,
or the money to fund them are voted
in some cities there would be no
down by voters in the districts.
noticeable difference; and if the city
There was a time when this was
hall employees strike, most people
not the case. Officials acted as if tax
would not even know it. To be sure,
resources were unlimited, and that illupublic employee strikes have costs
sion continued in some cities considerand inconveniences to the public, but
ably past the time when reality was
they seldom place intolerable pressure
apparent. But, in the last ten years,
on the public to settle at any price.
the pressures of tax burdens and the
On the employees' side, a strike
prevalence of taxpayer revolts have
causes them to lose all of their wages.
meant that public employees have had
Their incomes are cut off and few can
great difficulty bringing adequate
get outside jobs to help make up for
political pressures through the normal
their lost incomes. When the strike is
processes to protect their interests.
over, public employees seldom receive
They simply do not have the votes.
a lot of overtime pay to work off the
The strike obviously increases the
accumulated backlog, which is unlikely
political influence of public employees,
to occur in many private sector strikes.
but it is easy to overestimate the effecFor public employees, the strike means
tiveness of a strike. We can readily
a total loss of earnings. At the same
conjure images of a strike closing
time, the city continues to collect taxes,
down a city or a segment of governits income is not interrupted, and it colment; as a result, political resistance to
lects for services not remedied. Inthe union's demands will collapse and
deed, it is not unknown for public ofpoliticians will sign an agreement
ficials to secretly welcome a strike as a
leading to fiscal disaster. I would be
device for balancing the budget. Some
the last to deny that this can and someteachers unions have learned this paintimes does happen, but it need not
ful lesson when they strike in a school
and normally does not happen since
district facing budget problems. In
most public employee strikes are public employee
strikes, there may be
singularly ineffective.
pleasure rather than pain for the
employer at the tax and budget level.
What is the impact and effectiveness
This is, of course, directly contrary to
of strikes by public employees? In the
the consequences of private sector
first place, we can live without most
strikes. The private employer loses propublic services for a substantial period
duction, loses sales, and may perof time without serious consequences.
manently lose customers. In sum, a
Some few functions such as police and
strike by public employees, on the
fire protection are obvious exceptions.
whole, is less effective than a strike by
But if teachers go on strike at the
private employees.
beginning of the school year, what are
The crucial question is whether the
the consequences? For parents, the
political process is capable of resisting
consequences are that they must take
the limited pressure exerted by a strike.
care of their children for another month
What is the political position of public
-September is like August. For the
children, September is also like Augofficials who negotiate and approve the
settlements? If public officials embrace
ust, but the time lost is made up by
and cultivate the fear that a strike will
rescheduling classes. Vacations and
holidays are shortened or eliminated
cause the city to collapse or that
children will grow up unschooled, then
and school continues on into June until
they can create a real or imaginary
the required number of class days
have been provided . The effect of the
public panic. This panic situation will
justify their signing a costly contract
strike is simply to shift the scheduling
which is beyond the necessities of the
of the school year, unless the strike
situation or the fiscal capacity of the
continues for more than a month or six
city or school district. But public ofweeks. There are costs and dislocaficials have another alternative by maktions caused by the changed scheduling clear to the public what is ultimately
ing , but those are easy to exaggerate.
at stake-their public services and their
If the public works employees
taxes. They can say, " The union 's
responsible for repairing streets strike,
demands will require reducing garwe ride over the same potholes for a
bage collection from once-a-week to
few more weeks. (Holes which have
once every two weeks, " or " Giving in
been there since February will get
to the union will mean a six mill inrepaired in September instead of
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crease in taxes.'' When the voters see
that the union's demands will cost
them money, they may be willing or
even anxious to endure the inconveniences of a strike.
If public officials possess the wit and
the will to make use of the potential
political resource interest in the situation-that public employees are greatly
outnumbered at the polls-then the
political pressures of strikes can be
resisted . The danger that public
employee strikes will lead to overgenerous contracts comes at least half
from dimwitted public officials who
cannot or will not see their obvious
political strengths. The remaining half
of the danger comes from public officials who do not want to resist the
strike. They want the sense of panic
because they want the public to surrender . The union is thereby pacified
and the public feels relieved that it
escaped disaster. All that is needed in
order to deal with public employee
strikes is responsible public officials
and voters who will hold the public
employees politically responsible for
their settlements. If we must choose
between having public employees in
the politically weak position of having
to resort only to the normal political
channels or allowing them to strike in
order to exert added pressure in the
political process, then I would prefer
the latter.
There is, of course, a third alternative
-arbitration. Th is is the method used
in Pennsylvania and in some other
states for resolving disputes with police
and fire department employees. Arbitration has an immediate appeal
because it is seen as providing a fair
result without disruption of public services. However, we ought not be too
easily seduced for arbitration has certain questionable characteristics. First,
arbitration is wrong in principle
because the decisions to be made are
political decisions which involve
political values. Those decisions should
be made through the political process.
Arbitration often delegates the authority
to make decisions to one who has
neither political responsibility nor
political sensitivity. Further, arbitration
is wrong in principle because it
enables those public officials who
should have the authority and be
politically responsible , to get " off the
hook." They refuse to take responsibility for making an agreement and push
the decision off to an arbitrator. When

the arbitrator grants a wage increase,
the public officials disown any responsibility for the resulting tax increase,
proclaim that they are powerless and,
thus, rest the blame on the arbitrator.
Arbitration, in my opinion, is an escape
mechanism for timid and irresponsible
public officials.
Second, arbitration carries the potential for political fraud on the public. It is
not unknown for public officials, who
should be making the decisions and
bearing the political responsibility, to let
the arbitrator know by direct or indirect
means that they are willing to accept
more than they offered at the bargaining table. Through arbitration, elected
officials may in fact give benefits to the
union-sometimes for a political quid
pro quo-while proclaiming to the
public that it is all the arbitrator's fault.
This danger is plainly visible in Pennsylvania's arbitration of police and fire
department disputes. It is commonplace that, in these proceedings, the
city's member on the three-member arbitration board indicates subtly or
openly that an award substantially
above the city's offer will be accepted .
The " neutral " arbitrator is not likely to
insist that the award be for less and
may accept that the city's arbitrator will
file a dissent so that the city officials
can disclaim all responsibility.
Third, the arbitrators who make the
decision s may have limited competence
to deal with the problems involved .
Decisions as to public employee
wages and benefits involve fundamental tax and budget problems. Those
decisions are more closely connected
with city finance than with labor relations, and they involve considerations
totally foreign to collective bargaining
in the private sector. The expertise of
many of the arbitrators, however, is in
private sector labor relations not in
public finance. Many have no knowledge of the complexity of taxing structures or of the difficulty of comparing
tax burdens. They are unable to
penetrate even the most superficial
disguises of hidden funds in a municipal or school district budget, and are
being asked to make decisions which
have components beyond their
com prehension.
Fourth , even when the arbitrators
are competent, they may not be given
the information necessary to make a
responsible decision. The experience
in police and fire arbitration is that the
parties seldom provide more than the
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most sketchy and meaningless fiscal
data. The arbitrator can do little more
than make an uninformed guess, or
split the difference between what the
other two arbitrators indicate is acceptable. The arbitrator's lack of informed
judgment is concealed by his not
writing an opinion justifying the award.
Arbitration of limited sectors such as
police and fire is tolerable and is probably preferable to the other two alternatives. By comparing wage levels or
wage increases in a particular case
with those of police and fire departments in other cities, arbitrators do
have some guidelines. This may result
in a boot-strap process of arbitrators
relying on awards of other arbitrators
and may lead to the spiralling of wages
for these two categories of employees.
Arbitrators may also use as a guide the
wage levels or wage increases of other
employees in the same city. If these
wages are established by collective
bargaining within the political process,
then arbitration of police and fire may
reflect political decision-making. If the
police demand 15% and other city
employees have obtained only 5%, the
arbitrator can recognize that what the
police demand is out of line. The political process can provide a guide for arbitration, but if arbitration is relied on
generally or for a dominant sector of
employees, it has no such guide but
instead establishes the pattern for a//
public employees. The political process is thereby totally displaced or is
seriously distorted by arbitration.
Despite its superficial , seductive appeal , arbitration seems to me the least
attractive alternative for determining
public employees' terms and conditions of employment. It is at most
suitable for resolving disputes in those
sectors where strikes are genuinely intolerable. Although strikes in other sectors have costs and inconveniences
which should be avoided we, as employers-users of services and taxpayers-might like to be able to dictate
the terms of our employees , free from
the pressures of the strike. But it seems
to me that fairness to our employees
requires that they be allowed to use
the limited effectiveness of the strike to
protect their interests. As taxpayers
and users of public services, we want
more services for less money. We have
the overwhelming majority at the polls.
Our employees need the strike as a
countervailing measure in the political
process.
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The Insanity Plea: A Modern Dilemma
Editor's Note: The following articles have been adapted
from lectures delivered by Dr. Richard G. Lonsdorf, Dr.
Robert L. Sadoff, and Professor Louis B. Schwartz at the
Noyes Memorial Conference on November 4, 1982,
Norristown State Hospital, Norristown, PA.
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The Insanity Plea: A Plea for Reason
By Richard G. Lonsdorf, M.D.

Editor's Note:
Dr. Richard G. Lonsdorf is Professor of Psychiatry in
Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and
Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine. He was President of the
Mental Health Association of Southeastern Pennsylvania
from 1977 until 1980 and continues to serve that organization as a member of the Board. He is, as well, a member
of the Board of the Mental Health Association of Pennsylvania, is the immediate past-president of the Philadelphia Psychiatric Society and serves on the governing
council of the Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society. Most
recently Dr. Lonsdorf served as a commissioner on the
National Commission on the Insanity Defense of the
National Mental Health Association.
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Before examining the background and history of the
Insanity Plea, I want to comment on the current attacks
which have been made on that defense and some of
the proposals which have been put forth to alter or to
abandon it. Let me state at the outset that I do not feel
the insanity plea to be the most pressing problem at the
interface between the criminal justice and the mental
health systems today. Problems concerning competency to stand trial or sentencing or the delivery of
proper physical and mental health care in our prisons
are certainly more urgent in terms of the numbers of
people affected, and they should command more of our
attention. None of these problems, however, is an intriguing as the insanity controversy nor do they evoke
the emotional response that is stirred by the plea and all
of the philosophical and practical problems swirling
about it.
Each time a sensational trial takes place (as in the
John Hinckley case) a great deal of writing, discussion
and debate on the insanity plea surfaces, much of it
shrill and short-sighted, some of it probing and pro·
found, but a// of it questioning society 's ultimate social
values and beliefs on this troubling issue. The insanity
plea provokes a deep-felt sense of outrage in people
who perceive this as another example of the failure of
the criminal justice system either to provide justice in a
proper fashion or to make society secure from people
who mean to do harm . The ultimate questions the in·
sanity plea addresses are who is to be held morally
responsible and who is not, who is to be held blameworthy and who is not, and who truly has free will and
who is so mentally deranged that he has none. ALL of
these issues can be easily lost in the heat of the furor.
There are many who question whether or not an insanity plea is necessary, and many who feel that it
should be abolished . I think not. The rationale for the
plea and the notion that there are people so mentally
deranged that they cannot be held morally blameworthy, lies deep within not only our Anglo-American
system but within virtually every civilized system of law.
To eliminate this concept would do an enormous dis·
service to the laws which have been developed so ar·
duously and carefully over centuries of time.
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Criminal law must be based on the individual's being
responsible for his actions. Violators of our laws are
found to be guilty, which is another way of saying that
the individual has committed not only the act of which
he has been accused, but that he is morally responsible
and thus blameworthy and thus punishable. To punish
those who cannot be held morally responsible because
of the extent of their mental derangement, would only
undermine the moral integrity of the law. We uphold the
rule and validate the law by acknowledging the
exception.
Today, however, there are many who feel that too
often people are " getting off by copping a plea"-and
the plea that they are copping is the insanity plea. In the
past, those found not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity were
maintained, often for their lifetimes, in institutions called
hospitals for the criminally insane. Through this confinement our sense of humaneness was indulged, and we
were certain that the objects of our humanity would be
confined for lengthy periods of time in places called
hospitals, even though these hospitals were and are
very difficult to distinguish from prisons. Once removed
from society, these people were no longer the subjects
of our concern or of our interest.
All of this has changed and for a number of reasons.
Certain courts, for example, have begun to take the
"not guilty" aspect of the plea very seriously. To say
that these people are " not guilty" means that they have
been acquitted and , if this is the case, how are they different from other non-convicts whom we seek to commit
to mental institutions? Shouldn't they be given equal
due-process protections? How long should they be retained in custody? How long may they be retained and
under what conditions? The problem is clearly one of
dispositions. What does one do with these people once
they are found not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity? This is a
complex problem which I will touch upon later.
I want to get back to the current concern of whether
those found not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity are being
confined for too short a period of time. Sadly and inexplicably, statistics on the exact number of accused and
indicted felons choosing to plead not-guilty-by-reasonof-insanity and on the exact time of those eventually

found not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity, are very difficult to
obtain. There are only scattered reports. The states of
Michigan and New York and cities like St. Louis and
Louisville have some of the only fairly decent records
available. If one looks only at the truly serious crimes
(murder, rape, aggravated assault, kidnapping , etc.)about one of every 1,000 of those accused and indicted
chooses to plead not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity. In
roughly 25% of those cases, the plea is successful. In
short, it is not quite accurate to say that the insanity plea
is "as rare as a snakebite in Manhattan': It is not that
rare-but it is certainly not frequent and even less frequently is it successful.
It is true that in recent years there has been an increase in the number of persons pleading NGRI who
are charged with less serio.us crimes. But it is not true
that many people pleading NGRI are not seriously
disturbed . One study indicates that almost 90% of those
pleading NGRI are diagnosed as having very serious
mental disorders of psychotic proportions with over half
of these having a history of prior hospitalization for that
disorder.
Nor do most NGRI cases create the circus-like battleof-the-experts atmosphere which characterized the
Hinckley trial. A far more typical scenario is for the
defense to raise the issue of whether or not the accused
is competent to stand trial. That person is then
hospitalized and the hospital is asked to make an
assessment of both competency and criminal responsibility. In many instances, the report is accepted by
both sides. The determination of NGRI is pleabargained far more often than it is determined by trial.
Eighty per-cent of the findings of NGRI are pleabargained without any of the fanfare that occurred in
more notorious cases like Hinckley or with the " Son-of
Sam "
murders. In most of these instances, the clinical
finding of psychosis is decisive and determinative of the
outcome accepted by the prosecution whose own experts may well be tell ing them the same things.
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What happens to those people found NGRI? The
statistics are shaky but the best evidence is that they
spend roughly the same length of time in institutions as
they would have spent in prison had they been found
guilty as originally charged. Some evidence suggests
that they may spend somewhat less time after the verdict but, when the time spent in confinement before trial
is also counted, the NGRI acquittees spend just about
the same time confined as those found guilty as
charged.
It should again be emphasized that insanity is a legal
concept, not a psychiatric one. This point needs emphasis. It must be understood hat psychosis and/or any
other psychiatric diagnosis can never be equated with
insanity. The legal determination ultimately made by a
judge or jury is just that-a legal determination from
which certain consequences will flow. To be convicted
of most crimes two elements must be proved. It must be
established not only that the person committed the act
but also that he had the proper kind of mind-set mens
rea before the accused can be convicted. For instance,
over a period of centuries, we have distinguished four
different levels of homicide: first-degree murder,
second-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent
homicide. All of which have different mens reas, the
necessary elements which must be proved by the state
beyond a reasonable doubt if the accused is to be
found guilty of the crime charged. Many of the proposals that would do away with the insanity defense,
most notably those raised by the Reagan Administration, would permit only a defense which negates the
mens rea.
But beyond a mens rea defense there are certain
so-called affirmative defenses (self-defense, accident,
duress, etc.)-which totally excuse the accused from
responsibility for his acts, but only when very strict conditions have been met. Whether insanity is an affirmative
defense or whether it is simply a finding that negates
the mens rea, has been a subject of considerable
debate, discussion and argument for a long time. The
importance of deciding which choice to make lies in
whether the government or the defense carries the
burden-of-proof. If it is not an affirmative defense but
merely a negation of the mens rea, it becomes the
government's obligation, once the issue has been
raised , to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. That
is exactly what happened with the Hinckley trial. The
Hinckley jury did precisely what it was told . It was told
that the government had the burden of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt that Hinckley was not insane. The
simple fact of the matter is that while everyone knew
what Hinckley had done, the government did not meet
its burden, and Hinckley was found not-guilty-byreason-of-insanity. If insanity was regarded as an affirmative defense and had Hinckley the burden-of-proof
placed on him (as is true in about half of our states),
there might have been a rather different outcome.
Historically, the insanity plea goes back to early
Hebraic, Roman and Greek Law which provided that
certain classes of persons (deaf mutes, idiots, minors,
etc.) were not held responsible or punishable for their
actions. The sources of the modern Anglo-American
system can be traced to the thirteenth century. In 1278
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there was a case in which a man convicted of hanging
his daughter was released in the custody of twelve men
who were to keep him from harming himself or anyone
else. The reason given for this result was that "he committed the act while suffering from madness' : Thus,
more than seven centuries ago, there were circumstances in which society would not call people blameworthy even when it was abundantly clear that they had
committed the act of which they were accused. The
issue then became what had to be demonstrated in the
trial. In 1582, the test was "if a man is a natural fool or a
lunatic in the time of his lunacy or a child who apparently has no knowledge of good or evil doth kill a man,
this is no felonious act, for they cannot be said to have
any understanding will." The 1724 test provided for
exculpation if the defendant "doth not know what he is
doing no more than a wilde beest':
Lord Matthew Hale, the Chief Justice of the Court of
the King's Bench, published a work in 1736 that explained the insanity defense as being rooted in the
fundamental moral assumptions of the criminal law:
" The consent of will is that which renders human actions either commendable or culpable. Where there is a
total defect of the understanding, there is no free act of
the will. The test, the best measure I can think of, is
whether or not the accused hath yet ordinarily as great
understanding as ordinarily a child of fourteen years
hath."
The most famous of these early cases was the
McNaughton case which caused as great a public outrage and outcry as did the Hinckley case. McNaughton
believed that the Tories of his native city compelled him
to do certain things, were persecuting and prosecuting
him, were following him and were making life very difficult for him . He felt that the only way out of his problem
was to kill the leading Tory, Sir Robert Peale, the Prime
Minister of Great Britain. McNaughton set out to kill Sir
Robert but entered the wrong carriage and, in fact,
killed Edward Drummond, Peale's secretary. The case
attracted an enormous amount of attention and notoriety. Queen Victoria, who had been the subject of at
least three assassination attempts (one of her would-be
assassins was found not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity),
was outraged when McNaughton was found NGRI. The
Queen responded by summoning the House of Lords
"to take the opinion of the judges on the law governing
such cases.'' Fifteen judges of the common law courts
were called in, an extraordinary session under a nottoo-subtle atmosphere of pressure. They produced the
McNaughton's Rules, the same rules under which we
still try insanity cases in Pennsylvania and in twenty
other states. McNaughton's Rules state that the jury
should be told that every person is presumed to be
sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be
responsible for his crimes until the contrary is proved to
their satisfaction . Secondly, it must be clearly proven
that, at the time of committing the act, the accused
party was laboring under such a defect of reason from
disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know the nature
and quality of the act, that he did not know that what he
was doing was wrong. One can assume that this was
meant to be a cognitive test and, while the law has
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never defined exactly what was meant by " know" or
"defect of reason·~ or "nature and quality" or " right or
wrong': most commentators believe that " know" was to
be defined in the straightforward, simple, cognitive
sense of the word. For example, if one knows that pulling the trigger will cause the bullet to be projected
which, if it hits someone will do that person harm, one
has sufficient knowledge to fail the test. No sooner were
the McNaughton Rules pronounced than they were intensely attacked as being too strict and too narrow. Dr.
Isaac Ray, the most famous forensic psychiatrist of the
time, criticized them roundly stating that far more was
known about behavior than could be testified to under
the McNaughton Rules, and added that the mind does
not operate in such highly restrictive narrow compartments as the Rules implied. In order to meet such
criticism, many American jurisdictions joined an "irresistible impulse" addition to the Rules. This defense
called for the jury to acquit the defendant if he could not
control his conduct "even if a policeman were at his
elbow."
By far the most interesting experiment in devising a
new test to substitute for the McNaughton Rules was
done by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
in 1954 when Judge David Bazelon wrote the Durham
decision. If any single theme can be said to have pervaded the Durham decision, it was that of encouraging
the fullest possible range of psychiatric testimony.
Judge Bazelon hoped to encourage the psychiatrist "to
present the court and the jury with all of the information
that could be provided to answer the question of why
the defendant did this terrible thing ." The ultimate test
was to be that an accused is not criminally responsible if
his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or
mental defect. What followed was an eighteen-year
history of legal and psychiatric frustration as
psychiatrists tried to fit their constructs and testimony
into what they believed the law to be. The confusion
was great in part because there never was clear understanding of how the two disparate disciplines were to
mesh . Psychiatrists testified that persons suffered from
mental disease using psychiatric standards and then attempted to transfer these standards into what they
thought the law meant when it used the words " mental
disease': The courts assumed that the concept of mental disease was a clearly-defined one to the psychiatrists
and so they allowed such testimony. Both the court and
the psychiatrists acted as though the concept of mental
disease was well-understood and well-established-but
by the other side. The first indication that the emperor
had no clothes was revealed in a famous " weekendshift" decision . In 1957 on a Friday, a psychiatrist
testified that a particular defendant was a sociopath- a
person without mental disorder. Over the weekend , a
conference was held by the psychiatrists at St.
Elizabeth 's Hospital and the staff concluded that they
had been testifying incorrectly and that sociopathy was
indeed a mental disease. After all , the psychiatric
diagnostic manual said that sociopathy was a mental
disease. So the same patient, the same accused, the
same psychiatrist and the same diagnosis which were
declared no mental disease on Friday were declared
mental disease on Monday. Lawyers were outraged .

What eventually became obvious, however, was that
the practice of a psychiatrist transferring his constructs
into a totally different system really did not work well at
all . Attempts to remedy this intolerable set of circumstances were tried , definitions were offered, the
psychiatrists were told exactly how they should testify,
but tinkering with the Durham decision did not correct
the problem. Eventually, the same court overturned the
Durham decision and joined every other Federal
jurisdiction (and over half the rest of the states) in embracing the All standard .
The American Law Institute produced its insanity
defense rule in draft form in 1954 and finally adopted it
in 1961 . As adopted in the District of Columbia to
replace the Durham rule, the All standard states that " a
person is not responsible for criminal conduct if, as a
result of mental disease or defect, wt:lich is defined as
an abnormal condition of the mind which substantially
affects mental or emotional processes and impairs
behavioral controls, all of which have to be present at
the time of the conduct, he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." The
All standard obviously transcends the relatively restrictive cognitive test found in McNaughton and rather embraces the notion of volitional control as well. When the
combination of the All Rule in the District of Columbia
and the placing of the burden-of-proof on the government to prove non-insanity beyond a reasonable doubt
came together and produced the Hinckley decision, the
public and many legislators were outraged and demanded an immediate and final solution to the problem.
There have been many suggestions as to how the
problem should be solved . First, there is the suggestion
that the insanity plea be abolished altogether. The
states of Idaho and Montana have done so already.
Second , there is the suggestion that the verdict should
be changed and reworded from " not-guilty-by-reasonof-insanity'' to ''not-criminally-responsible-by-reason-ofinsanity" thereby clarifying exactly what an insanity
decision means and, thus, hopefully relieving the public
of its sense of fear that one can commit a serious crime
and get away with it. Third, the burden-of-proof might
be shifted from the government to the defenseperhaps by using " clear and convincing " as the standard of proof and thus making the defendant's task
somewhat more difficult while, at the same time , relieving the government of the all but impossible task of
proving someone not insane beyond anyone 's reasonable doubt. Fourth , the expert might be prevented from
testifying in ultimate terms. In other words, allow the
psychiatrists and psychologists to discuss schizophrenia, neurosis, psychopathy-any diagnosis in their
diagnostic manual-allow them to draw legal conclusions and, especially, do not allow them to testify as to
their opinions of the defendant's sanity. This remedy is
accepted and encouraged by the American Psychiatric
Association ''because it is clear that psychiatrists are
experts in medicine, not the law." Fifth, one could
eliminate the volitional aspects of the All and take a
more strictly interpreted cognitive McNaughton approach . Sixth, an entirely new verdict could be adopted
and added to those now available. One that is presently
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popular (it has become law in eighf states including
Pennsylvania) is the guilty-but-mentally-ill rule. There are
many philosophical and practical objections to such a
rule; these objections have proved conclusive enough
that at least three major investigations of the insanity
defense (those of the American Bar Association, the
American Psychiatric Association and the National Mental Health Association) caution against such an approach . Seventh, one might adopt a proposal bestexpressed in Senator Strom Thurmond's suggested rule
that says "it shall be an affirmative defense only if the
mental disease has destroyed entirely the ability to
understand." This proposal, which has considerable
support, would virtually destroy the insanity defense as
we have come to know it-insisting , as it does, that a
defendant would qualify for acquittal only if he thinks he
is shooting at a tree when he is, in fact, shooting at
another person, or when he thinks he is squeezing a
lemon when, in fact , he is choking someone else. All of
these proposals deserve far more time and far greater
depth than can be given here.
The largest pragmatic problem of all is that of disposition. What does one do with these people? Must we,
under legislative criteria for civil commitment, release individuals because they have been found "not guilty';
and then be unable to hold them without a finding of
present imminent danger to themselves or to others?
Can we not determine that these people are differentthat they have, in the recent past, committed acts
which, but for the acuteness and severity of their mental
disorders, would have been serious enough to find
them blameworthy and thus criminally responsible and
thus punishable. Can we not erect different but constitutionally permissible procedures that would allow us to
hold these people in custody until they can demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence before a court
of law, that they no longer pose a threat.
As of 1980 there were twenty states which allowed
persons found NGRI to be released to the community
on the authority of the mental health system Without the
necessity of a court hearing. Surely this is societal
madness of some degree. It offers far too little process
to protect the public and far too great a burden to be
placed on mental health professionals.
We cannot go back to the time when the key was
thrown away. It must be recognized that there are people who do improve and recover under good medical
care in good hospitals. There does come a time when
these unfortunate people do remit stably enough to permit release. The time does come, however, when a risk
must be taken and their liberty gradually must be
restored. Surely it is not beyond us to devise plans
which will both protect the civil rights of the NGRI acquittee and , at the same time, satisfy the public that
justice has been done and that their safety and their
sensibilities have been given full account.

The Insanity Plea:
The Role of the Psychiatrist
by Robert L. Sadoff, M.D.

Editor's Note:
Dr. Robert Sadoff is Clinical Professor of Psychiatry,

Director of the Center for Studies in S~cial-Leg~l
. .
Psychiatry, and Director of the Forenszc Psychza~ty Clmzc
at the University of Pennsylvania School of Medzcme.
A Fellow of the American Psychiatric Association, Dr.
Sadoff is a member and Chair of that Organization's Manfred Guttmacher Award Board, their Task Force on the
Right to Treatment (1974-1976), and their Committee_of
Abuse/Misuse of Psychiatry in the United States. _He zs also
past-President of the American Academy of Psychzatry and
the U:lw.
Dr. Sadoff sits on the Board of Directors ?f the American
Board of Forensic Psychiatry and the Amencan Board of
U:lw in Medicine. In addition, he is on the Board of the
Center for Rape Concern, Philadelphia; was a member of
the Pennsylvania Governor's Task Force for the ~en tally Ill
Offender, Farview State Hospital in 1977; and smce ~977
has been Consultant to the Maximum Security Hospztal,
Trenton Psychiatric Hospital, Vroom Building, Trenton,
New Jersey.
In 1979, Dr. Sadoff was the recipient of the Earl Bond
Award for Outstanding Teaching in Psychiatry at the
University of Pennsylvania. He has authored a~d coauthored seventy articles which have appeared m ~rofes
sional journals, and is the author, co-author or edztor of
three books of which one is Forensic Psychiatry: A
Practical Guide for Lawyers and Psychiatrists, Chas.
C. Thomas, Springfield, IL, 1975.
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Psychiatrists are called upon by lawyers and judges
to evaluate individuals in a number of different legal
situations, both civil and criminal. Psychiatrists involve
themselves in assessments of individuals and families
with regard to custody battles in domestic relations
cases, in commitment procedures, in personal injury actions, and in the evaluation of competency for various
purposes. Psychiatrists may be called upon in criminal
matters to assess the defendant's state of mind at any
stage in the proceedings from the point of arrest until
sentencing and, even afterward, for the evaluation of
the individual with regard to parole or probation.
Most of these assessments involve the evaluation
of the state of mind at the time of the examination , i.e.
present mental status. The forensic psychiatrist may
then apply his medical findings to the legal situation at
hand. Is the person mentally competent to stand trial? Is
he or she competent to be sentenced? Is the individual
disabled as a result of mental disorder?
The role of the psychiatrist involved in insanity cases
differs in that the assessment is for a state of mind at a
time prior to the examination. The psychiatrist must then
determine from all sources available what the defendant's particular state of mind was at the time he or she
became involved in a particular act. This is a very difficult assessment to conduct and may not be completed
on the basis of a psychiatric examination or interview
alone. That examination is necessary, but not sufficient.
The forensic psychiatrist, assessing an individual 's state
of mind at a prior time, must have access to all medical
records, hospital reports, police reports and statements
by others present at the time who can give valid observations of the defendant's behavior, attitude, composure, and appearance at the time of the alleged offense or as close to it as possible. Often the defendant
is not a reliable informant and the psychiatrist must rely
upon information or data collected from other sources.
Often the defense attorney has an investigator who is
able to collect this information and provide it for the
psychiatrist and often the district attorney or prosecutor
has access to other information that may be obtained
through discovery procedures.
When the forensic psychiatrist has the opportunity
to conduct a thorough and complete examination including interviews of family members, police officers
and others, as well as multiple examinations of the
defendant with the use of special testing when indicated , such as neurologic examination, psychological
testing, electroencephalogram, CAT scan, sodium
amytal interview, he is in a better position to assess the
state of mind of the defendant at the particular time of
the alleged act. We know from newspaper accounts
and interviews of psychiatrists involved in the Hinckley
case that countless hours were spent evaluating outside
materials and interviewing other individuals. In addition,
multiple hours were spent with Mr. Hinckley. The psychiatrists on both the defense and the prosecution
teams conducted what appeared to be thorough and
comprehensive evaluations, examinations and assessments. Why then did these psychiatrists differ in their
conclusions about Mr. Hinckley not only with regard to
the ultimate question of insanity but also with respect to
his diagnosis? The defense psychiatrists labeled Mr.
Hinckley as schizophrenic or psychotic, therefore having the requisite mental state necessary for insanity at
the time that he shot the President and three other men.
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The psychiatrists for the prosecution , however, after
their comprehensive evaluation, concluded that Mr.
Hinckley was not suffering from schizophrenia but was
labeled as having a number of personality disorders
which were not far from "normal': They concluded that
he was not, therefore, insane at the time of the shooting.
The question has been asked and should be asked
again: why did the psychiatrists called by the prosecution line up in the manner in which they did, and why
did the psychiatrists for the defense see Mr. Hinckley in
a different light? They all had access to the same
material, to the same individual and, presumably, to the
same skills at interviewing, evaluating, assessing and
collecting data. One does not know whether other psychiatrists were called upon by the prosecution or the
defense to assess Mr. Hinckley and, then , were not
called to testify. It happens fairly frequently that a
psychiatrist is called by the defense to examine a particular defendant and then tells the defense counsel that
his client is not mentally ill or was not insane, in his
opinion, at the time of the alleged criminal act. It is most
unlikely that defense counsel would call that particular
psychiatrist to testify at the trial because his testimony
would not help his client; rather it would harm him if the
insanity defense were to be raised. Conversely, if the
prosecution has requested a psychiatric examination
and their expert concludes that the defendant was mentally ill and fit the legal test of insanity in that jurisdiction ,
the prosecution is more likely to call the experts who
conclude that the defendant was sane to the witness
stand. This is a process of screening controlled by the
attorneys, not by the psychiatrists.
Another factor that enters into the final decision about
the expert witness psychiatrist is the track record he or
she may have in testifying in previous cases. Some
psychiatrists are labeled as "prosecution-oriented" or
"defense-oriented" and are called more frequently by
the attorney whose case most closely fits the philosophy
and orientation of the psychiatrist. If a psychiatrist acquires a reputation among attorneys and judges as
being either prosecution or defense-oriented, his
credibility suffers since the court will be able to predict
that psychiatrist's conclusions even before his assessment begins. It may seem unfair to prejudge particular
psychiatrists and even label them as "hired guns" but,
in the real world of forensic psychiatry, this is exactly
what occurs. Thus, it behooves the forensic psychiatrist
who is interested in maintaining credibility with lawyers
and judges, to remain as neutral in his orientation as
possible and to be available for examination and assess
ment for whichever side requests his professional services. There are some attorneys, both in civil and criminal
cases, who want an honest professional opinion and
respect the psychiatrist whose conclusions may differ
from their own needs and who can provide sufficient
evidence or data to support their conclusions. This is
helpful to the attorney since it aids in pointing out the
weaknesses of his case, helps him to prepare his
witnesses and , also, can prepare his cross-examination
of the experts on the other side.
Beyond philosophy lies the realm of hard reality and,
beyond the Hinckley-type cases which are relatively
rare " battles of the experts", lie the more usual insanity
cases wherein the experts on both sides agree on the
diagnosis and very often agree on the legal conclusions 21
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of insanity or culpability. Many insanity cases are
negotiated when the experts on both sides agree.
These cases are not remarkable and rarely hit the headlines of our newspapers. It is in a case such as Hinckley
and in those like it, where psychiatric experts differ and
where public questions are raised about the validity and
reliability of psychiatric diagnostic criteria and
psychiatric testimony.
It should be pointed out that psychiatrists have no
formal training in the evaluation of a defendant for the
insanity defense. The training consists of skills at interviewing and diagnosing mentally ill people. The application of the. medical findings to the legal test is an individualized, often subjective application which is not standardized and is most vulnerable to attack on crossexamination. Even if the psychiatrists for defense and
prosecution agree that the defendant is schizophrenic,
they may disagree that he was insane. It is important to
distinguish clearly, for the jury and for others, between
mental illness and legal insanity. All psychotics are not
insane and all individuals found to have been legally insane at the time of a particular act may not have been
psychotic.
It should also be pointed out that there are differences in examining a defendant for defense counsel
as opposed to examining for prosecution especially
in Pennsylvania. The defendant likely will be more
cooperative with his own attorney's consultant or expert
than he will with the psychiatrist working for the District
Attorney's Office. There are also more special tests that
can be performed when working as a defense expert
such as the use of sodium amytal, hypnosis or polygraph , in order to ascertain various data which may not
be utilized by the psychiatrist consulting with the prosecution. On the other hand, the prosecution's psychiatrist
has access to policy reports, police interviews and
police investigation data long before it becomes available to the defense psychiatrist. In Pennsylvania, the
prosecution psychiatrist may not conduct a complete
psychiatric examination of the defendant if defense
counsel prohibits it. Pennsylvania is one of the last remaining states that recognizes the defendant's right to
protect against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment when interviewed by psychiatrists for the prosecution to whom they may give inculpating statements during the examination . In some cases, the defendant has
been ordered by the court to appear for examination by
the prosecution psychiatrist but has been allowed not to
answer questions he/she does not wish to answer.
These distinctions highlight the difference between
the general psychiatrist and the forensic psychiatrist
working in insanity cases. The general psychiatrist treats
mentally ill people. These are people who need help
and come to the psychiatrist because they are in emotional pain and want to be relieved of their distress.
They are likely to be coopertive, honest and open with
their treating psychiatrists. On the other hand, the forensic psychiatrist is not a treating psychiatrist but an
evaluator. Defendants do not come to him because
they are hurting , but because someone else has requested the evaluation. They are not likely to be as
open or as honest with the examining psychiatrist. Thus,
it is necessary for the forensic psychiatrist to utilize
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special skills in his interviewing techniques to obtain sufficient, valid information in order to make reliable and
valid conclusions. How does the forensic psychiatrist
know if his patient is being honest with him and if what
the patient is saying is true? The psychiatrist does not
always know and that is why outside sources of verification must be utilized rather than taking the defendant's
word for it. For example, the defendant will tell the
psychiatrist that he does not remember what has happened at the time of the alleged offense. Very often,
rather than reflecting a true amnesia, such statements
are self-serving and reflect the defendant's wish for the
psychiatrist not to know. In such an instance, without
entering the issue of guilt or innocence, I may use a
polygraph just to determine whether the defendant is
lying about not remembering.
Ethics in forensic psychiatry are developing but are
not yet standardized. There are differences between the
examining psychiatrist and the treating psychiatrist. The
treating psychiatrist always represents his patient or is
the agent of his patient when treating him. The forensic
psychiatrist, on the other hand , always represents the
person who calls him for consultation. This may be
defense counsel, prosecutor or judge. During the
assessment and evaulation phase, the forensic psychiatrist must recognize to whom he owes allegiance in the
event of an apparent conflict. For example, suppose the
defendant tells the defense psychiatrist information he
does not wish that psychiatrist to pass on to his lawyer.
The psychiatrist may feel that this information is important and cannot promise the defendant that he will
not reveal it to his attorney who is there to help him
legally.
When conducting an examination for the District
Attorney's Office, the psychiatrist must alert the defendant of his role, explaining whom he represents, what he
will do with the information he collects, and how this information will affect the defendant. These are the socalled " psychiatric Miranda warnings" that psychiatrists
must present to defendants and other individuals who
are examined during forensic situations. In my opinion,
it is not ethical for a psychiatrist to conduct an examination without first explaining to the person being
examined about the procedure and how it will affect
him or her.
Another ethical issue in criminal assessments revolves
around the question of whether a prosecution psychiatrist may examine a defendant before the defendant is
represented by counsel. In my opinion, it would be
unethical for a psychiatrist representing the prosecution
to obtain information that may be harmful to the patient
before the defendant has an opportunity to discuss the
examination with his attorney and prepare for the examination. The psychiatrist working for the prosecution,
after all, is not there to trick the defendant or trap him or
her into giving inculpatory statements that may be obtained in a more legitimate fashion.
Recently, following the Hinckley case, there has been
a hue and cry to modify the insanity defense or to
eliminate it. After much emotional pressure, cooler
heads have prevailed and the recommendations by
both the American Bar Association and the American
Psychiatric Association have retained the insanity
defense and both have recommended to eliminate the
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volitional aspect of insanity. This exists in the American
Law Institute Model Penal Code wherein the defendant
has lacked "substantial capacity to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law· : Many have argued that
psychiatrists cannot predict such behavioral or volitional
matters and should stay with the cognitive concept of
wrongfulness of the act, which exists in the other arm of
the All test and in the McNaughton test for insanity.
In my opinion it really does not matter what test is
used if the jury is sympathetic with the defendant. Insanity is a means of exculpation for a number of
reasons. The defense of insanity is designed to give the
jury a means of exculpating the defendant. There are a
number of cases in which insanity was pled for that
reason and the jury responded accordingly. Some
related to euthanasia and others to criminal behavior
which was questionable in the eyes of the jury.
A word about testimony in insanity cases. Prior to
court appearance, the expert is the agent of the side
that calls him. On the witness stand, the expert is the
agent of the court and must not become an adversary
witness. He may advocate his point of view and his
opinion, but must recognize that any psychiatric
testimony can be effectively attacked by good crossexamination. His role, in my opinion, is to teach rather
than to advocate. He is called as an expert because he
has training and experience beyond that of the average
intelligent lay-person.
I support the adversary system and would not want a
jury of psychiatrists to determine insanity. There are too
many differences and too many pressures within the
profession. The psychiatrist going into court must learn
to play by the rules of the game and must not use the
forum of the courtroom to advocate changes of
substance.
Finally, what is to be done with a person who is found
not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity? The major criticism
following Hinckley was that persons found NGRI would
get out early and would terrorize the community.
Statistics have shown that this is not the case and that
those found NGRI may be confined longer than those
convicted of comparable crimes. There are two models
that have been recommended for treating the person
found NGRI. One is the Oregon Committee which
follows the individual through the hospital and into the
community. Decisions are made by a committee composed of psychiatrists, lawyers and parole officers. The
other model, employed in the state of New Jersey, is
that of the gradual release from maximum security confinement to the community after careful consideration
following a hearing by the court.
The role of the psychiatrist in insanity cases is a complex one and should not be taken lightly and should not
be undertaken by the inexperienced psychiatrist. Those
psychiatrists who wish to work in this field should obtain
training and experience through fellowship programs,
through involvement in courses at the APA and the
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, and
then should strive for certification by the American
Board of Forensic Psychiatry. This Board is a certifying
organization which promotes excellence in the field. If
we continue to conscientiously upgrade the quality of
our care, we will continue to improve our consultation to
the legal system which requires our services.
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The Insanity Plea:
The View of a Professor
of Criminal Law
by Louis B. Schwartz
Benjamin Franklin and
University Professor of Law

Editor's Note:
Professor Louis B. Schwartz is Benjamin Franklin

and University Professor of Law at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School. Prior to his joining that
Faculty in 1946, he was a member of the staff of the
United States Department of Justice. Mr. Schwartz 's
publications in the area of Criminal Law include: The
Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute

(1962), co-reporter with Professor Herbert Wechsler of
Columbia University Law School; A Proposed Federal
Criminal Code with Commentaries (1971), prepared as
Director of the National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws; and Law Enforcement Handbook:
Police in the Criminal Justice System (West Publishing
Company, 2nd, ed., 1980). Mr. Schwartz has served on
advisory committees for the American Law Institute and
the American Bar Association, and has also served as consultant to various federal agencies and congressional committees in the field of Criminal Law.
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I want to place the problem of the insanity plea in
proportion . Actually , it is a peripheral problem of law enforcement and public security today. The plea is not
entered often, few people succeed when it is entered
and, if one does succeed with the plea, the alternative
sentence to a mental hospital is very tough . Hence the
question is raised: Why does the subject of the insanity
plea rouse such passion? To me the answer is that there
is something wrong with the press or, if there is such a
thing , with the public's psyche. Psychiatrists ought to be
throwing some light on why so much relative attention is
given to a phenomenon that is related so little to the
security of the general public ..There are few people
who escape and fewer who can count on escaping.
The plea has nothing whatsoever to do with the main
purpose of the criminal law system , which is based on
deterrence primarily, in order to make some people
behave more in conformity with generally accepted
norms.
I would like particularly to discuss the goals of the
criminal law since they are so distinct from the goals of
therapy. Therapy, if the word has any meaning, is an effort to help the person in need of psychiatric treatment;
the criminal law sometimes is said to include the aim of
rehabilitation for those who have gone astray. We live,
however, in an era of considerable skepticism about the
ability to achieve such a rehabilitative goal under the circumstances of prisons or juvenile detention facilities.
Another goal which does throw light on this passionthis public press hysteria on the subject of insanity as a
defense -is retribution . I speak respectfully of the goal
of retribution in criminal law. It was, for a long time, quite
disrespected . More recently, " an eye for an eye and a
tooth for a tooth " has been recognized as a taming of
that basic and pervasive retributive instinct which could
claim lives for relatively minimal offenses. Ages ago,
forms of torture were devised, like boiling in oil , branding , chopping off limbs, etc.-in order to vindicate either
the retributive or the deterrent goal. Against this
background , a measured retribution- " an eye for an
eye " -was an ameliorative reform in the criminal law. It
still serves the function of maintaining a certain proportionality between what was done by the criminal and
what is about to be done to him or to her. I do not wish
to sponsor the notion that we are entitled to be as
violent to the criminal as the criminal was to his victim.
We are or pretend to be better people than the
accused . We are deliberately and , as a social body,
choosing instruments that are harsh at best to serve
social goals, and we would like to minimize suffering ,
even the suffering of those who have violated our
norms.
There is another goal posited for the penal law and
that is incapacitation . That goal is hardly impaired by
any regime that is adopted for the defense of insanity.
There is going to be incapacitation of people found to
be dangerous by the civil commitment route or by the
prison route . I cannot generate a passion in myself
about the decision of which route to go because there
are so few cases which have surfaced in which the in-

sanity defense has been raised. I feel that one of the important penal code goals is that everyone be tried
fairly-that they be tried by the same laws, and that the
potentials of their convictions and acquittals be fairly
well-described so that the matter is not left at-large to
juries or even , for that matter, to judges. The idea that
people are tried by general norms in our society has a
few consequences. One is that there is not a special
status for psychiatrists, who are often outraged that they
have to bring their expertise to bear in very strange
situations in which cross-examination often unfairly
makes them appear like fools. They are often confronted with colleagues who have opposing opinions,
some of whom have not examined the defendant. It is
true that there have been excesses in cross-examining
and other treatment of psychiatric testimony. It is not
true, however, that psychiatrists for that reason should
be exempt from cross-examination or be exempt from
explaining their assessment of human beings, although
it may be a complicated and esoteric explanation . Nor
should we toy with the idea of abandoning the jury
system . There are many experts who might say, " What
do those twelve dumb jurors know about this? ': especially when the jurors have been confused by the confrontations of psychiatrists possessing the same degrees and the same qualifications. There are experts in
metallurgy who testify on airplane accidents; there are
experts in pathology who testify to the cause of death
and have differences of expert opinion in that area;
there are engineers who testify that the design of the
automobile was or was not as safe as could reasonably
be expected . So I do urge that psychiatric testimony not
be looked upon as an unique conflict of law and expertise in a related profession, but as an unavoidable circumstance of a legal system .
I would like to address some alternative rules of
responsibility besides the McNaughton Rule and the
All Rule. Two proposals were laid before the American
Law Institute and illustrate how unavoidably inconclusive any of the rules have been. The first of them was
advanced by my colleague and co-reporter on the
Model Penal Code and went as follows: psychiatric
testimony should not be constrained by McNaughton 's
Rules, or should not be limited to the question of
whether the defendant utimately knew what he/she was
doing and knew that it was wrong, but should fully
describe the situation or the state of mind at the time of
the act as well as it could be reconstructed. Then, according to this criterion , the jury would be told to convict
the accused if it seemed " just" to do so. Although that
rule was advanced by a very able, discerning, sensitive
man, I opposed it. What might be thought of as " just"
by a jury-twelve different people chosen ad hocwould be a function of their particular sensitivities and,
more especially, their view of the horror of the crime. In
other words, if the crime were bad enough , many jurors
would say, " I don 't care how crazy he was, he ought to
go to jail for this': Psychiatrists, on the other hand , might
well regard the very aggravating circumstances of the
crime as a symptom of the inability to control.
There is another perhaps more subtle, law-related
point. In the structure of the court and jury in our legal
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system, the jury has the final word but the court tells
them the rules of the game. Although juries are not controlled, that is about as far as we can go to regularize
the matter. Some jurors do disregard charges; however,
I think that more often than not they take seriously what
the judges tell them . Therefore, I see it as a total
abrogation of the legal system to throw up our hands
and tell the jury to convict the accused if it thinks conviction is "just' : The law exists to guide juries in determining when it is just or unjust. Although I disapprove of
this rule, there are very good people in the legal
universe who think it the correct way to handle the
problem.
There are also many good people who think that the
repeal of the insanity defense is the right way , although I
do not. I do not because I relate guilt and culpability. If
someone is indeed seriously ill , I concede that the function of the criminal law should not be to threaten that
person or other persons in similar situations. In other
words, if we are attempting to deter people by means
of the criminal justice system, then it should be recognized that some people are sufficiently ill as to be undeterrable , i.e. beyond the reach of that system. It does
not make sense to put such people on the criminal law
track; rather they should be put on the hospital track.
Secondly, insofar as the criminal justice system is
retributive , we all know that the feeling of retribution
against someone who is obviously ill is ordinarily less.
Retributive feelings are diminished for persons who are
very young , for persons whose circumstances tend to
lead them to commit crime and, also, for persons who
are seriously mentally ill. The retributive impulse in these
cases is lessened, and there is no reason not to give in
to the impulse of mercy-the correlative of retributionwhen the effect upon the deterrent force of the system
is absolutely unimpaired. The generality of those who
commit crimes is not going to be encouraged (unless
by the crazy press), by the occasional acquittal of a
Joey Coyle or a Hinckley, to steal lost articles or to
shoot a President.
Again , in an effort to put this debate into proportion,
here is another alternative test to the McNaughton and
the All Rules which I advanced some time ago but
which failed to pass. (The All Test was adopted instead.) Under my proposal , the accused would be examined by a psychiatrist to determine whether other
persons exhibiting his symptoms are substantially
undeterrable. If they are considered undeterrable, then
it would be inappropriate to include such people on the
criminal law track. On the other hand if they seem deterrable , despite their illness, then they should be placed in
the criminal law track. I have realistically accepted the
fact that nearly everyone is sick. Some people are continually washing their hands after contact with a door
knob, others do not go under ladders, some individuals
at the Law School express themselves by stabbing
paintings in the halls, some write graffitti in the
lavatories, etc. Actually, I regard illness as virtually
100%. I also regard criminality as 100%, having never
spoken to an adult who had not done that for which the
penal code prescribed jail. One has either cheated on
taxes or brought objects across borders without paying

customs fees or driven recklessly or tried some cocaine.
One could run down the list and convict everyone! It is
not a " we-they" proposition.
What finally do I have to offer in the way of a program? At my age, a little improvement is all that I expect. First of all, if we had good judges, we would not
have had the ridiculous spectacle which took place with
the Hinckley Trial. The eight psychiatrists-four experts
testifying on each side-only fed the general insecurity
with the notion that such trials are a rich man 's game. It
is quite well-settled that a judge has the discretion to
limit cumulative testimony and , clearly, in the pre-trial
conference, the judge could have limited the psychiatric
testimony to one on each side. Secondly, the right of
the psychiatrist to examine the accused should be
established. The use of hypothetical questions, which
can confuse any expert and certainly could confuse any
jury, must be limited. The law should permit a judge to
instruct the jury that testimony by a properly qualified
psychiatrist should be given more weight than " lay
testimony" about the superficially " normal " behavior
of the accused . I am not suggesting that lay people
who witnessed a defendant immediately at the time of
his/her act be barred from testifying . Hearing testimony
describing a defendant's behavior and appearance is
useful data and should not be excluded . I do think,
however, that to equate the testimony of professionals
with that of a lay person only misleads a jury. Furthermore, there should be constraints on the release from
custody of people committed on the grounds of insanity; both the district attorney and the trial judge should
participate in that decision . It is much too easy to
discharge a person from a hospital because all of the
beds are occupied and because more people are
being admitted than are being released.
Finally something could be done to shift the burdenof-proof on the issue of insanity. Although criminal law
properly requires the state to prove every element of the
offense " beyond reasonable doubt'; I do not feel as
strongly about the defense of insanity as I do about
other elements like- did the defendant purposely take
life? That clearly goes to culpability. I see the defense of
insanity not so much as an element of the offense as a
delineation of the limits of the criminal justice system . It
is a kind of jurisdictional issue. Therefore, it would not
bother me too much if the burden of coming within this
" defense" were placed to some extent on the
defendant.
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"Looks like old Roberts decided to take it with him. "

Some things you can take with you.
Such as the enduring thanks of your family and your law school for
having remembered both with a single gift.
The Pennsylvania parade of Planned Gifts includes bequests and
trusts-e.g. , the Charitable Remainder Trust, Charitable Lead Trust and
the OTIP (Qualified Terminable Interest Property) Trust.
Gifts to the Law School can take the form of cash or securities, of
course, but also real estate, life insurance, antiques, oil wells or oil
paintings.
Working with you , we can show you a dozen ways-some so fresh
as to be downright exciting-to provide handsomely for those you love.
To protect your property from harsh taxation . And to produce lasting
help to the school that played no small part in your lifetime success.

Planned Giving
Programs
University of Pennsylvania
Law School
3400 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 191 04
(215) 898-7 489
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Let's Hear From You!
We want "all the news that's fi to print" about you-professionally or otherwise. The Journal's Alumni Briefs Section is the perfect forum for keeping in
touch with classmates and Alumni. Information as well as your informal
photographs are welcome. Please use the space below and return to the Law
School in the attached envelope.
Name and Class: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
What's New: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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Associate Professor Henry
Hansmann has written an article
(coauthored by John M. Quigley) on
" Population Heterogeneity and the
Sociogenesis of Homicide" for publication in the September 1983 issue of
Social Forces. Mr. Hansmann
presented a paper, "The Current State
of Law and Economics Scholarship"
at a conference on The Place of Economics in Legal Education in Denver,
Colorado in October 1982. The paper
will be published in the June 1983
issue of The Journal of Legal
Education.

Professor Paul Bender was Distinguished Visiting Lecturer in Law at the
University of Alberta Law School in
Edmonton , Canada, in January 1983.
He lectured on the new Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which
became part of the Canadian Constitution in April 1982. During the past year,
Mr. Bender has given a paper on the
Canadian Charter at conferences at
Dalhousie University Law School ,
Halifax, Nova Scotia, and at the University of Western Ontario Law School ,
London , Ontario. This summer (and for
three summers past), he will lecture on
the United States Bill of Rights and the
Canadian Charter at a Seminar for
Canadian Lawyers conducted by the
Canadian Human Rights Foundation .

Professor Bender's article on the
United States Bill of Rights and the
Canadian Charter is scheduled for
spring 1983 publication by the McGill
Law Journal.
During this past semester, he taught
a course to University of Pennsylvania
undergraduates in the Equal Protection
Clause. The course was part of the
University's general honors program
given primarily to Benjamin Franklin
Scholars.

Associate Professor and Associate
Dean Stephen B. Burbank is a member of the planning committee for the
Third Circuit Judicial Conference. His
article, " Procedural Rulemaking Under
the Judicial Councils Reform and
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of
1980' : appears in the December 1982
issue of the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review.
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Professor George L. Haskins has
returned to regular full-time teaching
following a sabbatical research leave
during which he completed three articles to be published in 1983. The articles relate to "Inconvenience and the
Rule For Perpetuities" (written for
Festschrift honoring William Franklin
Fratcher): " Lay Judges: Magistrates
and Justices in Early Massachusetts"
(written for History of the Massachusetts Legal Profession); and "Sources
of the First Laws of Pennsylvania': Mr.
Haskins was also working on the jurisdiction of English ecclesiastical courts
and their influence on colonial laws in
New England.
In connection with the celebration
of the 1OOth Anniversary of Dalhousie
University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Mr.
Haskins has been invited to give an
address on sources of the early laws
of the maritime provinces in Canada.
Professor Louis B. Schwartz
moderated a panel discussion on the
Victim and Witness Protection Act of
1982 in March . The discussion was
presented as a " video teleconference"
by the Federal Judicial Center (Professor A. Leo Levin, Director) as part of
its education and training program for
federal judges, prosecutors, defenders,
probation officers and others involved
in criminal justice. Emanating from
Washington , the panel discussion
reached centers throughout the United
States where interested officials gathered to follow the discussion and to put
questions back to the panelists.
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Alumni Briefs---

Professor John 0. Honnold is the Arthur Goodhart Professor of the Science
of Law at Cambridge University, England, for the year 1982-83. What follows is
the letter sent by Mr. Honnold at holiday time to his friends at the Law School,
which best explains his experiences.

Dear Friends,
After only three months here, America seems so far away! If I tell you a little
of how things are here, maybe you will send some news to help us get back m
touch. But I can't say that we're lonesome. Life has been too busy and
delightful I
This is the fifth week of the Fall ("Michaelmas ") Term, and already I almost
feel at home teaching in the remarkable garment that is prescribed for this and
other rites-a flowing black "thing" with "sleeves" (sewn up at the ends) that
dangle below the knees. (There are slits at the elbow where the arms come
out.) I give one of 26 year-long courses ("papers'') for graduate (LL.M.) candidates. The lectures-two hours a week-are traditionally des;gned to pomt
the way for independent study; the chance to choose only 3 or 4 out of 10 to
12 questions on the exam provides lee-way for independent study. (lsn 't that a
good idea?) 1have 30 or so students, a relatively large group. Most are from
abroad-a cross section of the old empire, w1th 8 to 10 from the U.S.A.
1have prepared "Cases & Materials" (mostly Commonwealth) to use as problems under the 1980 Sales Convention. In spite of warnings that there m1ght
be resistance to a problem-discussion approach, I feel good about the start
we have made.
The deepest mystery is: Where is the "law school"? The only tangible
center is a 3' round oaken table in the University "combination" (lounge) room
that happens to be connected to the Squire Law Library. Each morning at 11
(as Clarence [Morris} will recaiO those few who are nearbyyather aroun~ th1s
little table for tea, and engage m a strange act1v1ty called conversation -the
cheerful sharing and development of ideas.
Don't get the idea that the Law Library is the "Ia~ school,~· for i_t has no
.
class-rooms and there are no offices for admm1strat10n (Parkmson slaw
doesn't apply here) or faculty. Three of us are developing prescnpt1ve nghts m
small tables.
What is the secret? The COLLEGES, where the Dons receive colleagues
and students in great living-rooms with fireplaces and bookshelves. But how
can one do intensive research without a base in the library? So far I have no
idea. (My college, Clare Hall, is small, modern, confined to graduate students
and research scholars, receptive to wives and a complete delight!)
.
There is so much to tell, but I must close. Our house and garden are JUSt
beautiful. Partridges and pheasants visit us although we are only a 15 mmute
bike ride from the center of the University. The bike path goes alongs1de~ and
sometimes through, pastures with cows and horses: In our little red English
Fot:d Fiesta we have made ever-widening ventures mto the flat but charmmg
country-side of East Anglia. Colleagues and other friends have been so kmd
as to leave us breathless.
Annamarie joins in warm greetings. We would love to hear from you. How
are you?
As ever,

'27 Philip Werner Amram of
Washington, D.C. received the first
prize of the Section of International
Law and Practice of the American Bar
Association for his work in private international law, particularly for his services at the Hague Conferences and
with the State Department's Advisory
Committee.
'28 Burton R. Laub of Carlisle, Pennsylvania was honored at ceremonies
held at the Dickinson School of Law on
March 5, 1983. He was Dean of that
school from 1966 until his retirement in
1974. Before going to Dickinson, he
was a county prosecutor and judge in
Erie, Pennsylvania. Mr. Laub was a
member of the Judicial Advisory Committee of the Pennsylvania Council on
Crime and Delinquency, was viceChairman of the Supreme Court
Criminal Procedural Rules Committee
and was a member of the Pennsylvania State Board of Law Examiners.
He has written numerous articles for
Keystone-Lawyer 's Desk Library of
Practice. He was also instrumental in
the establishment of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania and
served as its first reporter.
'29 Irvin Stander, a Referee in the
Pennsylvania Bureau of Workmen's
Compensation, has been appointed
a Lecturer in Law in the Graduate
Studies Division of the Temple University Law School , where he is teaching
a 14-week course on " Pennsylvania
Workers' Compensation Law and Practice." He also will deliver two lectures
to University of Pennsylvania Law
School Professor Edward Sparer's
class on "OSHA and Workers' Compensation". Mr. Stander is Chairman of
the Workers' Compensation Committee
of the Philadelphia Bar Association and
a member of the Workers' Compensation Survey Committee of the Pennsylvania Bar Association .
'31 JacobS. Richman was elected
President of the Mid-Atlantic Region of
the Zionist Organization of America. He
is a partner in the Philadelphia firm of
Richman & Richman.
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Honorable Samuel J. Roberts
became Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania on January 3,
1983. In his address on that occasion,
Judge Roberts reflected on the enormous increase in the volume of litigation facing the Commonwealth's Court
since he first became a judge in 1952.
Justice Roberts will deliver the third
Alumni Luncheon Lecture on Wednesday, April 27 at the PNB Concourse,
Philadelphia.
'32 Alexander F. Barbieri of Philadelphia tendered his resignation as Court
Administrator of Pennsylvania on
January 17, 1983.
'36 David Berger, of the firm Berger

& Montague, Philadelphia was appointed chairman of a special committee to recommend improvements in
the U.S. Supreme Court procedure for
the selection of cases. A former
Chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar
Association, Mr. Berger served a tenyear appointment to the Committee
that drafted the Federal Rules of
Evidence.

'38 Sylvan M. Cohen, of the Philadelphia firm Cohen, Shapiro, Polisher
Shiekman & Cohen, received the
Alumni Award of the University of
Pennsylvania on Founder's Day,
January 22, 1982.
'40 Frank C. P. McGlinn was recently
elected to a three-year term as Councillor of the Philadelphia Historical
Society. He is Vice-President of
Western Savings Bank, Philadelphia.
Robert W. Sayre received this
year's Fidelity Award from the Philadelphia Bar Association and Fidelity Bank.
A partner in the firm Saul , Ewing,
Remick & Saul , he was active in the
creation and development of the Public
Interest Law Center of Philadelphia
and was cited for "service to the cause
of justice in the metropolitan Philadelphia area'' and for promoting the provision of ''a full range of legal services
to community groups traditionally
without access to legal assistance" .
'41 Bernard M. Borish, President of
the University of Pennsylvania Law
Alumni Society, was honored as one of
the "Special Men of Women's Way"
in February, 1983, having devoted his
time and talents to the Women's Way

coalition, an umbrella organization for
numerous Women's service agencies
in Philadelphia.
Michael C. Rainone, of the firm
Rainone & Rainone, Philadelphia, was
elected President of the Lawyer's Club
of Philadelphia after serving two years
as Vice-President.

'42 Frederic L. Ballard of the
Philadelphia firm Ballard, Spahr,
Andrews & Ingersoll , was Honorary
Co-Chair of An Evening at J. E.
Caldwell honoring "Special Men of
Women 's Way" in February, 1983.
'47 Frank B. Boyle is President-Elect
of the Pennsylvania Bar Association . A
distinguished practicing attorney for 35
years in York, Pennsylvania, Mr. Boyle
will be installed as President at the
Pennsylvania Bar Association Meetings
in May, 1983.
Robert M. Landis, a partner in the
Philadelphia firm of Dechert, Price &
Rhoads, was recently named 1983
Chairman of the Board of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Honorable Alfred L. Luongo,
Chief Judge of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, was honored by the
Grand Lodge of Pennsylvania, Order
of the Sons of Italy in America, at the
Bellevue Stratford Hotel.
Henry W. Sawyer was honored at
the First Annual Civil Liberties Award
Dinner, sponsored by the American
Civil Liberties Unions of Pennsylvania
and Greater Philadelphia. The noted
civic leader and senior litigation partner
in the Philadelphia law firm of Drinker,
Biddle & Reath also spoke at Naturalization Ceremonies sponsored by the
Philadelphia Bar Association in December, 1982. Formerly on the staff of
the U.S. Department of State, a Philadelphia Councilman-at-large and a
Commissioner on the Delaware River
Port Authority, he is now a member of
the Board of Trustees of Americans for
Democratic Action , the Academy of
Music and the Philadelphia Orchestra.
'48 Henry T. Reath, a senior partner in the Philadelphia firm of Duane,
Morris & Heckscher, received the
American Judicature Society's Herbert
Harley Award . The Honorable Arlin M.
Adams, '47, presented the award, in
recognition of Mr. Reath's efforts "to
promote the effective administration of
justice." A past Chairman of the Board
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of Governors of the Philadelphia Bar
Association and former member of the
House of Delegates of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, Mr. Reath
recently served as counsel to several
common pleas courts in their efforts to
establish more freedom in budgetary
determination, and as a guest lecturer
at the National Conference of Chief
Justices of the State Supreme Courts.
E. Eugene Shelly was named to
honorary membership of the Chapel of
Four Chaplains in Philadelphia. Active
in the Rotary Club and in volunteer
services to people of all races and
faiths, Mr. Shelley is a partner in the
law firm of Fluhrer, Medill and Shelley,
York, Pennsylvania.

'49 Honorable Louis J. Carter of
Philadelphia has resigned as an Administrative Judge with the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. He served as
Chairman of the three-member Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board for the ongoing USNRC public hearing on the
safety of operations at Units 2 and 3 of
the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station
near Buchanan, N.Y.
M. Stuart Goldin, a partner in the
Philadelphia firm of Isenberg, Goldin &
Blumberg, is Co-Chairman of the 1983
Luncheon Lecture Committee of the
Professional Education Section of the
Philadelphia Bar Association.
Thomas A. Mcivor is now practicing in Paris, France. Concentrating
primarily on international tax law, he
was formerly with the U.S. State Department.
'51 Arthur R. Littleton, a partner in
the Philadelphia firm of Morgan, Lewis
& Bockius, was elected to a three-year
term on the Board of Governors of the
Philadelphia Bar Association .
'52 Anthony S. Minisi, of the Philadelphia firm of Wolf, Block, Schorr &
Solis-Cohen, was recently elected ViceChairman on the Philadelphia Bar
Association's Board of Governors.
'53 Honorable Edward J. Bradley,
President Judge of the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas, served as a
faculty member during a recent seminar on "Practice in the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas. " The seminar
was a review of the standard practices
and procedures followed in handling
civil action in the local common pleas
court.
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Theodore S. Coxe announced the
relocation of his offices to 5448 Germantown Avenue, Philadelphia, PA.
19144.
'54 Robert Montgomery Scott of
the Philadelphia firm Montgomery,
McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, was appointed President and Chief Executive
of the Philadelphia Museum of Art.
'55 W. Thomas Berriman, of the King
of Prussia, Pennsylvania firm of
Berriman & Schwartz, was the course
planner for the recent seminar on
"Physicians and Hospital Relations:
Cooperation and Conflict,'' sponsored
by the Delaware Valley Hospital Council and the Pennsylvania Osteo-Medical
Association.
John J. McCarty, a member of the
Philadelphia firm of Raynes, McCarty,
Binder & Mundy, was a featured
speaker at the first 1983 "Case of the
Month" program sponsored by the
Philadelphia Trial Lawyers Association .
'56 George L. Bernstein, chief executive officer of the international accounting and consulting firm Laventhal
& Horwath, announced the firm's
mergers with CPA firms in Cleveland,
Las Vegas and Los Angeles in
November, 1982, bringing to 13 the
number of mergers concluded in the
past 19 months.
Paul D. Guth, a senior partner in
the Philadelphia firm of Blank, Rome,
Comisky & McCauley, was nominated
by President Reagan to be United
States representative on the Joint
Commission on the Environment established by the Panama Canal Treaty of
1977. Currently a Trustee of the
Federation of Jewish Agencies and the
Delaware Valley College of Science
and Agriculture, he was elected a
Delegate to the Republican National
Convention in 1980 and acted as
Chairman of Philadelphia County for
the Committee to Re-elect Governor
Thornburgh.
Peter J. Liacouras, the Dean of
Temple University Law School from
1972-1983, is the seventh President
of Temple University.

'57 Stephen I. Richman of
Washington, Pennsylvania is actively
involved in work in the area of occupational lung disease law and litigation.
Recently, he presented papers to the
American Lung Association and to the
American Thoracic Society at their Annual Joint Meeting, to a conference on
the Federal Black Lung Program sponsored by the Energy Bureau, and to
the Annual Joint Meeting of the
American Society of Clinical Pathologists/College of American Pathologists. Legal consultant to the Franklin
Institute and contractor to the Department of Labor in assisting it in complying with the Black Lung Revenue Act
of 1981, he is the author of an article
published in the December, 1981 issue
of The Annals of Internal Medicine
which explores the American systems
of Worker's Compensation for occupational lung disease.
'58 Howard Gittis, a partner in
the firm of Wolf, Block, Schorr & SolisCohen was elected Chancellor of the
Philadelphia Bar Association for 1983.
At the Association's annual meeting in
December, 1982, he marked as his
main objectives for the 8,300-member
Association the continuation and acceleration of legal education and community outreach programs.
'59 Alexander A. DiSanti of Media,
Pennsylvania was elected President of
the Delaware County Bar Association.
Oscar N. Gaskins announced the
reorganization of his firm Oscar N.
Gaskins & Associates with offices in
Suite 1310, the Robinson Building, 42
South Fifteenth Street, Philadelphia,
PA., 19102.
Bernard M. Gross, president of
the Philadelphia firm of Gross & Sklar,
was elected to the post of Supreme
Recorder of Tau Epsilon Rho International Legal Fraternity.
Paul P. Oberly, of the firm of Saul,
Ewing, Remick & Saul, Philadelphia,
was elected a fellow of The American
College of Probate Counsel.
'60 Jesse Choper was appointed
Dean of Boalt Hall, the law school of
The University of California at Berkeley.
Dean Choper was featured in the article , "A Sure Bet at Boalt Hall" in the
January 10, 1983 issue of The National
Law Journal.

John Jakubowski announced
the relocation of the office of Smith &
Jakubowski to 2001 PSFS Building,
Philadelphia, PA 19107, and the opening of new offices at 1330 Easton
Road, Abington, PA 19001.
'61 Paul R. Anapol, of the firm of
Anapol, Schwartz, Weiss & Schwartz,
P. C., 1900 Delancey Place, Philadelphia, PA 19103, served as a faculty
member for a seminar entitled "Practice in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas", which reviewed the standard practices and procedures followed
in handling civil action in the local
common pleas courts.
'62 Kenneth M. Cushman, of Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, Philadelphia, is program co-chairman of the
American Bar Association's Fidelity
and Surety Law Committee, Tort and
Insurance Practice Section which is cosponsoring a program with the Forum
Committee on the Construction Industry of the ABA entitled, "Bankruptcy-Crisis in the Construction
Industry".
Richard B. Schwartz, of the firm of
Anapol, Schwartz, Weiss & Schwartz,
P. C., has relocated his office to 1900
Delancey Place, Philadelphia, PA
19103.
'63 Steven A. Arbittier was a courseplanner and moderator at the full-day
seminar presented by the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas, the Pennsylvania State Civil Judicial Procedures
Committee of the Philadelphia Bar
Association and the Pennsylvania Bar
Institute entitled " Practice in the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.
He is a member of the Philadelphia
firm of Wolf, Block, Schorr and
Solis-Cohen.
David C. Auten, a partner in the
Philadelphia firm of Reed, Smith , Shaw
& McClay, was named Chairman of the
Board of Stewards of the University of
Pennsylvania's Christian Association.
Currently serving as the National Chairman of Annual Giving for the University, he was presented with the University's Alumni Award of Merit in 1981.
David H. Marion, Vice-President of
Kahn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P. C.,
Philadelphia, was elected ViceChancellor of the Philadelphia Bar
Association.
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'64 William H. Platt was appointed by
former Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Chief Justice Henry X. O'Brien to the
Court's Criminal Procedural Rules
Committee. Presently District Attorney
for Lehigh County, a post he has held
since 1976, Mr. Platt was formerly
Chief Public Defender of Lehigh
County. He is Chairman of the Lehigh
County Criminal Rules Committee, and
acts as state director for Pennsylvania
in the National District Attorney's
Association .
'65 Harvey Bartle, Ill, of the Philadelphia firm of Dechert, Price & Rhoads,
was named Vice-President of the Philadelphia firm Historical Society.
William H. Ewing, of the Philadelphia firm of Goodman & Ewing , was
honored as one of the "Special men of
Womens' Way" in February, 1983.
Sheldon Sandler, a partner in the
firm of Young , Conaway, Stargatt &
Taylor, Wilmington , Delaware, was
recently designated Chairman of the
Third Circuit Lawyers Advisory Committee for 1983 by Chief Judge Collins
J . Seitz of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit. Mr.
Sandier is also the first Chairman of the
newly-created Delaware State Bar
Association Labor and Employment
Law Section.
'66 John M. Desiderio has become
counsel to the firm of Scolari , Brevetti ,
Goldsmith & Weiss, P. C., 230 Park
Avenue, New York, 10169. His article
" Private Treble Damage Antitrust Actions: An Outline of Fundamental Principles" has been published in 48
Brooklyn Law Review 409 (1982) . Mr.
Desiderio has been elected to the
Board of Directors of The Opera
Ensemble of New York.
'67 Norman Pearlstine, of Brussels,
Belgium , is editor and publisher of the
Europe edition of the Wall Street Journal, and is responsible for the creation
of that publication . Volume I, Number I
of the newspaper appeared on Monday, January 31 , 1983. Instrumental in
several other overseas operations
undertaken by the Journal, Mr.
Pearlstine was the first managing editor
of the Asian Wall Street Journal, and
the first national news editor of the Wall
Street Journal in New York.
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Alan Spielman was the featured
speaker at a lecture on entertainment
law presented recently by the Lawyers
for the Arts Committee of the Philadelphia Bar Association .
Jonathan Stein has been appointed Acting Executive Director of
Community Legal Services, Inc. , Philadelphia. An associate with CLS since
1968 and formerly its Chief of Law
Reform, Chief of Special Projects and
Head of the Welfare and Health Law
Unit, Mr. Stein was counsel in the U.S.
Supreme Court case establishing the
right of resident aliens to receive public
assistance, and in the first decision
establishing the right of blind teachers
to teach in public schools. He was cofounder of the Pennsylvania Judicial
Selection Project to increase the
numbers of women and minorities
on the Bench .
'68 Peter G. Glenn, after a decade as
Professor of Law at the University of
South Carolina, returned to the private
practice of law as counsel to the firm of
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 1700
Union Commerce Building , Cleveland,
Ohio 44115, as of May 10, 1983. Professor Glenn was associated with that
firm from 1969 to 1972.
David H. Lissy was elected Assistant Vice-President of Gulf+ Western Industries, Inc., New York, having joined
that organization in February 1982 as
an Executive Assistant in the office of
the Exect:Jtive Vice-President. Previously, he was with United Brands
Company where he was an Assistant
Vice-President. From 1969 to 1976,
Mr. Lissy held a number of key
governmental positions in Washington,
including Special Assistant to President
Gerald Ford and Associate Director of
the White House Domestic Council.
'69 William G. Adamson has
become a member of the Philadelphia
firm of Harvey, Pennington, Herting &
Renneisen , Ltd. , Seven Penn Center
Plaza, Fourth Floor, Philadelphia, PA
19103.
The Honorable Margaret
Burnham was appointed National
Director of the National Conference of
Black Lawyers. Judge Burnham was
the first Black woman to be appointed
to the judiciary in Massachusetts and
served for more than five years as a
justice on the trial court there. A former
staff attorney at the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund , and a civil rights and
criminal defense practicioner, the
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Judge received national attention as
an attorney on the team which
represented Angela Davis in her 1970
homicide prosecution. Judge Burnham
joined the National Conference of
Black Lawyers in 1969, founded the
Boston Chapter of NCBL in 1973, and
received the NCBL Judge of the Year
Award in 1978.
J. Greg Miller, of the firm of Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, Philadelphia,
spoke at an American Bar Association
program on " Bankruptcy-Crisis in the
Construction Industry" , co-sponsored
by the Forum Committee on the Construction Industry, and the Fidelity and
Surety Law Committee of Tort and
Insurance Practice Section .

'70 Gary Tilles, former Chief of the
Civil Division in the U.S. Attorney's
Office, has become associated with the
firm of Manchel, Lundy, Lessin &
Busacca, Eighth Floor, The Robinson
Building, 42 South Fifteenth Street,
Philadelphia.
Steven R. Waxman was named
Secretary of the Philadelphia Bar Association . He is with the law firm of
Bolger & Picker, Philadelphia.
'71 Sheila Taenzler McMeen and E.
Ellsworth McMeen, Ill, '72, are the
parents of newborn twins, James
Cunningham and Mary Josephine
(January, 1983), Jonathan, age 5, and
Daniel, age 3. Ms. McMeen is on leave
from the New York City firm of Davis,
Polk & Wardwell.
'72 Ronald Clayton is a member of
the firm of Fitzpatrick, Cella, Harper &
Sciento, 277 Park Avenue, New York,
New York 10172. ·
Mark D. Jonas has withdrawn from
the firm of Hamburg , Rubin , Mullin &
Maxwell , and has opened offices at
Suite 400 , One Montgomery Plaza,
Norristown , PA 19401 .
E. Ellsworth McMeen, Ill, and
Sheila Taenzler McMeen, '71 , are the
proud parents of Jonathan, age 5,
Daniel , age 3 and twins, James Cunningham and Mary Josephine (born
January 1983). Mr. McMeen is a partner in the firm of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby
& MacRae, New York.
Victor S. Perlman became a
member of the firm of Clark, Ladner,
Fortenbaugh & Young, 1818 Market
Street, 32nd Floor, Philadelphia, PA
19103.
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David L. Pollack and Roslyn Goold
Pollock, '73, of Radnor, Pennsylvania,
became the parents of Richard Jacob
on September 30, 1982. Mr. Pollack
was elected to a three-year term on the
Board of Governors of the Philadelphia
Bar Association.
Melvin R. Shuster, former Assistant Chief of the Economic Crime Unit
of the Philadelphia District Attorney's
Office, is associated with the firm
of Margolis, Edelstein, Scherlis &
Kraemer, 1315 Walnut Street, Fourth
Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19107.
Richard Walden, who recently
completed a five-year term as Commissioner of the California Health Facilities
Commission, is Executive Director of
Operation California, Inc. He is involved in a long-standing debate with
the U.S. government over the human
aspect of economic sanctions, especially those pertaining to the Foreign
Assets Control Act, part of which sets
L,Jp a special list of embargoed countries forbidden to receive developmental aid from private U.S. donors.
'73 Michael R. Klekman has opened
offices at 501 Fifth Avenue, New York,
New York 10017, and is engaged in
commercial litigation and general
practice.
Roslyn Goold Pollack and David
L. Pollack, '72, of Radnor, Pennsylvania, became the parents of Richard
Jacob on September 30, 1982.
'75 Beverly K. Rubman is associated
with the Philadelphia firm of Goodman
& Ewing, 1429 Walnut Street, Fourteenth Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19102.
'76 Sheryl L. Auerbach, of the
Philadelphia firm of Dilworth, Paxson,
Kalish & Kauffman , was a faculty
member for the seminar " Practice in
the Philadelphia Court of Common
Pleas' '.
Edward H. Merves, a former
associate with the Philadelphia firm of
Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley,
was appointed Corporate Counsel and
Assistant Secretary of the Industrial
Valley Bank, Philadelphia.
Glenn F. Rosenblum, a former
Editor-in-Chief of Pennsylvania District
and County Reports and a former law
clerk to Judge Berel Caesar, '54, is associated with the firm of Korn, Kline &
Kutner,1521 Locust Street, Fifth Floor,
Philadelphia, PA 19102.

'78 Rudolph Ackeret (LL.M.) opened
offices at Postsrasse 1, Ch-8303 Bassersdorf/Zurich , Switzerland .
William F. Simms, Ill, is associated
with the firm of Oscar N. Gaskins &
Associates, P. C., Suite 1310, Robinson Building, 42 South Fifteenth Street,
Philadelphia,
19102. PA
Maurice L. White, Jr. became
associated with the firm of Oscar N.
Gaskins & Associates, P. C., Suite
1310, Robinson Building, 42 South Fifteenth Street, Philadelphia, PA 19102.
'79 Joseph C. Crawford, an
associate in the firm of Schnader,
Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia,
is the 1983 Chairperson of the Young
Lawyers' Section of the Philadelphia
Bar Association .
Douglas Bern Fox and Deborah
Large Fox, '80, became the parents of
Kelly Anne on November 14, 1982.
Donald M. Millinger, an associate with the Philadelphia firm of Wolf,
Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, has
been appointed Adjunct Associate Professor in the College of Humanities and
Social Sciences at Drexel University.
He will be teaching a course entitled
"Art, Entertainment and the Law" for
the Master of Science Degree in Arts
Administration.
M. Kelly Tillery formed the partnership of Leonard, Tillery & Davison with
offices at 1530 Chestnut Street, Fourth
Floor, Philadelphia,
19102. PA
'80 Richard D' Avino, an associate
with the Washington , D.C. firm of
Cohen & Uretz, has been appointed
Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown University School of Law.
Deborah Davis is presently working
in the Litigation Section of The Exxon
Company in Houston, Texas.
Paula Dow was previously with the
East Texas Production Division of The
Exxon Company and is now in
Houston, Texas in Exxon 's Litigation
Department.
Charles F. Forer became associated with the firm of Goodman &
Ewing, 1429 Walnut Street, Fourteenth
19102. PA
Floor, Philadelphia,
Deborah Large Fox and Douglas
Bern Fox, '79, became the parents of
Kelly Anne on November 14, 1982.
Brian Saunders is employed in the
legal department at the Bayway (New
Jersey) Refinery, The Exxon Company.

'81 Shinichi Gotoh (LL.M .) and his
wife, Mariko, became the parents of
Dai-chi on August 12, 1982.
Catherine Kessedjian Khachikian
(LL.M.) joined the firm of Jeanclos,
Lussan, Sammarcelli & Wiriath, 37,
avenue Kleber , 75116 Paris.
David Loder returned from a
University of Pennsylvania-sponsored
Thouron Fellowship for study in
England. He received an LL.M .
degree in international law at the
London School of Economics, and is
presently with for the firm Duane,
Morris & Heckscher, Philadelphia.
Frederick M. Stein became
associated with the firm of Fox,
Rothschild , O'Brien & Frankel, 2000
Market Street, Philadelphia,
19103. PA
Andre Van Landuyt (LL.M.) and his
wife, Myriam, became the parents of
Dimitri on December 7, 1982.
'82 Twekiat Menakanist (LL.M .)
was appointed a Director of the Graduate Program of the Faculty of Law,
Thammasat University in Bangkok,
Thailand . He received his masters'
degree in Thailand and recently completed a book entitled Criminal Law
and Its Problems which will be published next year.
Helen Milgate (LL.M .) has joined
the firm of Herbert Smith & Company,
Solicitors, at Watling House, Cannon
Street, London , England.
Dale L. Moore, law clerk to Judge
Louis H. Pollak of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, will be teaching next year at
Albany Law School, Albany, New York.

Deepest Apologies
The Law Alumni Journal erroneously listed the Honorable Joseph
T. Murphy, '36, on the "In Memoriam "
page of the Winter 1983 issue. The incorrect information came from the
University's main office.
Happily we disclaim what, in Judge
Murphy's own words, was " a grossly
exaggerated report" and affirm that
Judge Joseph T. Murphy, '36, is alive
and well and sitting on the Bench of
the Philadelphia Court of Common
Pleas.
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In Memoriam:

James Hannon Chadbourn, Professor
The University of Pennsylvania Law School 1936-1950
Jim's powers of mind and intellect were awesome. As
a Harvard colleague has accurately noted, Jim was a
great teacher precisely because he was a formidable
scholar. And with all his magnificent abilities, Jim was a
wise, witty, charming, and caring man. Although always
friendly and accessible to students and colleagues
alike, Jim remained a very private person. Knowing
how deep his commitments would be, Jim gave his
friendship sparingly. How fortunate and privileged then
were we four at Penn-A. Leo Levin, Frederick G.
Kempin, Jr., Barton E. Ferst and myself-to have been
able to call Jim-friend.
Harvard mourns its loss; and Penn mourns too. And
in our mourning , I find consolation in knowing that Jim
was very happy during his years here. It was because
of Jim that my four years as student and instructor at
Penn were halcyon days. It was also during his Penn
years that Jim married his devoted Erika, and that their
two daughters and son were born . In a letter in the
Spring of 1976, already stricken with the cancer which
he battled till he had completed his labors on the
Wigmore revision, Jim wrote:
One of the iron gates to Harvard Yard is inscribed
"In Memory of the Dear Old Times'.' /like that. As I
look back, my times at Penn were nothing less than
"dear',' and the fun you and I had occupies a
special niche in the memory.
Mine was a law school marriage and, as a demonstration of our very deep affection and admiration for Jim, my
wife and I gave our three sons the same middle nameChadbourn. Thus, we will always celebrate and remember the genius, humanity and joy of this rarest of men.
Had Jim Chadbourn's career ended in 1950 when at
age 45 he left Penn, he would have been remembered
not only as a leading scholar in his chosen fields-not
only as the supreme master of the law professor's artbut as a teacher who, during the years 1936-50, put a
lasting stamp on hundreds of Penn graduates who today are active practitioners, judges and teachers. And
yet in 1950, there was so much to come-a decade at
UCLA and two decades at Harvard of continued
brilliant teaching and of a prodigious outpouring of
scholarly writing culminating in Jim's monumental revision of Wigmore. Jim died at Harvard on September
28, 1982 at the age of 76.

Morris L. Weisberg, '47
Partner, Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

James H. Chadbourn graced the Penn Law faculty
for fourteen years, from 1936 to 1950. He left behind a
host of admirers and friends, former students who felt
enriched by his teaching and grateful for the privilege
of having known the man . Chad, as we called him ,
passed away in Cambridge, Massachusetts last September after more than half a century of teaching,
writing and changing the law.
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There have been many fitting tributes, including an
issue of the Harvard Law Review dedicated to his
memory. He was indeed an eminent scholar, a luminary who left his mark on the development of the law,
primarily in evidence and procedure. But when Chad
taught, his primary devotion was to his students. The
press of projects and research yielded to his concern
for the business of teaching . He spent endless hours
honing the hypos, organizing the structure of the
presentation , searching for the striking case to make a
point. And he wanted the learning to be fun . I was one
of many attracted to teaching by his example and I
recall vividly the half-page of advice that arrived shortly
before I taught my first class: " Let the students laugh a
lot, " he urged , "not only at themselves, but also at
you ." It was good advice, particularly when one had the
example of the master to try to emulate. And what a
master he was! How exhilarating an hour with him ,
whether at Penn or at U.C.L.A. or at Harvard! Nor did
the humor substitute for rigor of analysis, or an understanding of history, or an appreciation of the practical
implications of doctrine.
His friendship knew no bounds, as so many have attested. And he left a mark on people that, as another
former student-turned-teacher put it, '' will yet affect . ..
hundreds who will pass through the ... classrooms of
his former students in the years to come."
How rich the legacy!
A. Leo Levin, '42, Professor of Law,
The University of Pennsylvania Law School
and Director, The Federal Judicial Center

We hear a good deal these days about the ennui of
second and third year law students. Part of the problem , it seemed to me, lies in the methods and quality of
our teaching. We tend to assume that what appears to
work in first-year classes will work in the later years. That
may be, but only if one is as gifted a teacher as was
Professor Chadbourn . Few of us are, and yet there are
many who teach , or at least teach evidence, because of
the profound infuence that Chadbourn had on them in
the classroom . I am among them . His classes were unconventional. First, he was often late. Second , he paid
little attention to the assigned cases. Third , he was
amusing. By being amusing Chadbourn engaged his
students' attention. Once he had it, he exposed the absurdities and complexities of the law of evidence with
such clarity and relish that ennui was impossible and
learning was inevitable.
Late in Professor Chadbourn 's life, I had occasion to
correspond with him about a question that had arisen in
my research. Kind and helpful as always, he closed his
letter: " It is good to know that you are at work at 3400
Chestnut and that you like Philadelphia. I did, too."
Stephen B. Burbank,
Associate Professor and Associate Dean ,
The University of Pennsylvania Law School ,
Harvard Law School , '73

In Memoriam
'21 Joseph Smith
Philadelphia, PA
December 9, 1982
'22 Franklin Bates
Southampton, PA
December 13, 1982
'25 Morton Meyers
Johnstown, PA
December 5, 1982
'29 Stanley B. Cooper
Plymouth Meeting, PA
January 13, 1983
'36 Reuben Miller
Philadelphia, PA
December 30 , 1982
'38 Harry A. Greenberg
Miami Beach, FL
December 1, 1982
Harris J. latta, Jr.
Haverford, PA
September 8, 1981
'39 Joseph M. Kilgarif
Philadelphia, PA
February 1, 1983
'42 Mabel Ditter Sellers
Ambler, PA
February 18, 1983
'48 Robert P. Shoemaker
Waynesboro, PA
December 6, 1982
'51 Martin S. Goodman
Meadowbrook, PA
January 4, 1983
'60 I. Grant lrey, Jr.
Wayne, PA
December 3, 1982
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End Notes _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Reflections on Ventman:
a moral dilemma
by Mark Kramer, '85

Stanley E. Biddle Jr.,-"Ventman '!_was reported
by the Office of University Counsel as having been " between fifty and sixty years old at the time of his death,
was once a member of the United States Armed Forces
and had family in the Philadelphia area. "
Mr. Biddle was a well-known presence on the University of Pennsylvania campus for the last decade and
spent a great deal of his time at the Law School.
Although he requested no handouts, many members of
the Law School Community offered Mr. Biddle food,
money and clothing.
Two members of the Law School Administration,
Registrar Gary Clinton and Assistant to the Dean Rae
d i Blasi, raised money which was donated to a local
shelter for the homeless in Mr. Biddle 's memory. In addition, Penn Law Students collected two hundred
dollars which they gave to the Philadelphia Committee
for the Homeless.
Stanley E. Biddle, Jr., was buried at the Whitemarsh
Memorial Park on March 14, 1983, next to his father, a
suburban Philadelphia physician.

I never spoke with him , but I thought a great deal
about Ventman. His presence was a constant source of
disquiet, and spurred me to examine myself and the
education I was receiving .
I wanted to speak with him because I was curious,
but also because I wanted to acknowledge his dignity
as a human being. Yet, I did not speak with him, for the
same reason that I would hesitate to feed a stray doglest he attach himself to me and, to my embarrassment,
I find that I had unwittingly accepted a responsibility
for him.
So I discovered that I could walk past a hungry and
desolate pariah nearly every day for months and take
no action. I began to understand how the average
bystander to a crime could let cowardice , embarrassment and the lack of an obvious solution obscure clear
moral obligation. I felt trivial emotions outweigh "deep
values. '' And I wondered if I would be able to fulfill the
responsibilities of a lawyer to his client and to society.
My law school courses seemed inadequate in preparing
me for that task. I felt as if I were being taught to use
a dangerous weapon with no instruction about when its
use was justified or what damage it could do. What I
needed was a course on moral courage, and I
wondered how many others needed it too.
Ventman's constant and unaided presence at the
Law School was a singularly strong metaphor for the
lack of assistance which lawyers give to the needy in
general. He was the reminder of a desperate world
·which we privileged law students will hardly ever face,
but which is far more prevalent than our experience
would suggest. Although we espouse a responsibility
for pro bono work, it is the rare graduate who actually
assumes it. Is this the fault of the graduate, or IS 1t also a
consequence of the Law School curriculum?
.
For me, Ventman provided a test of moral qual1ty. In
failing it, I feel continuing turmoil. Perhaps it has caused
me to be more conscientious about opportunities for
public interest work. Of course, my idealism and
discomfort will fade, as have other failures and resolutions. But my legal education will be the less for his
absence.
Reprinted with permission of The Penn Law Forum , Vol.
No. 5. , Thursday, February 17, 1983.
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